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INTRODUCTION 
Precedent seems to exercise an influence that greatly exceeds its logical 
importance or legal force .... Sometimes, to be sure, there is a reason for 
a measure of uniformity, and sometimes there is enough similarity in the 
circumstances to explain similar outcomes; but more often it seems that 
there is simply no heart left in the bargaining when it takes place under the 
shadow of soine dramatic and conspicuous precedent.' 
* Associate Professor of Law, Emory Law School. A.B. 1994, Princeton; J.D. 1997, 
Yale.-Ed. I am grateful to Omri Ben-Shahar, for his invitation to panicipate in the "Boilerplate ": 
Foundations of Market Contracts Symposium at the University of Michigan Law School, and for his 
invaluable counsel. Many thanks also go to Howard Abrams, Bill Bratton, Bill Buzbee, Bill Camey, 
Han Choi, Mitu Gulati, Marcel Kahan, Russell Korobkin, John Pottow, Robert Schapiro, and 
William Whelan, as well as the participants at the "Boilerplate " Symposium and colloquium atten­
dees at the University of Colorado Law School, for their advice and assistance. Finally, I appreciate 
the efforts and contributions of my research assistants and the editorial staff of the Michigan Law 
Review. 
I. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 67-68 (1960). 
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That boilerplate is pervasive is hardly surprising. In a variety of ways, 
standardized terms in day-to-day contracts serve an essential cost-saving 
function. By this measure, one might expect less frequent reliance on boi­
lerplate in high-value contracts among sophisticated parties. Yet standard 
terms would appear to be no less widespread in contracts among the sophis­
ticated. Notwithstanding their representation by able counsel, charged to 
craft comprehensive and detailed, but also particularized, contracts, such 
parties will commonly conclude agreements comprised heavily of tradi­
tional terms--contracting norms of a sort-rather than terms tailored to the 
distinct features of their particular bargain.2 
Examples of seemingly suboptimal but persistent contracting norms­
the choice of standard contract terms over Pareto preferred tailored ones­
are abundant. Several scholars have highlighted the longstanding inclusion 
of unanimous action clauses in sovereign debt contracts, notwithstanding 
the widespread perception of such terms as inefficient.3 To similar effect, 
Michael Klausner and Marcel Kahan have pointed to the standard put-at-par 
remedy offered in event risk covenants, as well as the use of a standardized 
rating decline trigger, as suboptimal technologies.4 Bill Bratton, finally, has 
noted the curious absence of business covenants restricting the creation and 
offering of certain new classes of preferred stock.5 
Why do such standard terms-a species of boilerplate-persist notwith­
standing the ready opportunity of sophisticated parties to abandon them in 
favor of tailored terms more suited to their particular circumstances? Two 
explanations have most commonly been offered. To begin with, reliance on 
standard terms may minimize the transaction costs of drafting and negotiat­
ing contract terms. Yet the representation of sophisticated parties by 
2. Various scholars have focused attention on boilerplate usage by sophisticated parties, 
including under the rubric of "The Form." See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate 
and Economic Power in Auto Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REv. 953 (2006); William W. 
Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convenible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 667; 
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination 
of Sovereign Bonds, 5 3  EMORY L.J. 929 (2004); Claire A Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in "Le­
galese '', 77 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 59 (2001); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and 
Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or "The Economics of Boilerplate "), 83 VA. L. REV. 7 1 3  
( 1 997) [hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, Standardization and Innovation]; Marcel Kahan & Michael 
Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or .Management Entrench­
ment?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 93 1 ( 1 993) [hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in 
Bonds]. 
3. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the 
Shadow of the International Order, 53 EMORY L.J. 691 ,  694 (2004). 
4. See Kahan & Klausner, Standardization and Innovation, supra note 2, at 75 1 ;  Kahan & 
Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds, supra note 2, at 962. 
5. See Bratton, supra note 2, at 689. Other examples of suboptimal boilerplate can also be 
identified, including the difficult-to-justify use of a weighted-average approach to calculating con­
version price in convertible bonds, see Michael A Woronoff & Jonathan A Rosen, Understanding 
Anti-dilution Provisions in Convertible Securities, 74 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1 29 (2005), the calculation 
of anti-dilution adjustments based on the entire amount of a paid dividend, rather than simply the 
portion of the dividend that exceeds the threshold amount permitted, see Marcel Kahan, Anti­
Dilution Provisions in Convertible Securities, 2 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1 47, 1 55 ( 1 995), the warrant 
formula utilized in convertible debt, see id. at 1 58, and the standard anti-dilution provision for the 
sale of assets, see id. at 159. 
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sophisticated counsel arguably limits the significance of additional drafting 
or negotiation costs and potentially enhances the returns on tailoring.6 When 
a sophisticated party is engaged in complex contracting with another sophis­
ticated party, thus, the transaction costs of tailoring any given term may be 
quite small as measured against the cost of contracting generally. Complex 
contracts among such parties, meanwhile, are more likely to constitute par­
ticularized transactions, maximizing the return on additional negotiation and 
draftsmanship. 
An alternative model, developed by Michael Klausner and others,7 posits 
that network effects in the choice of contract terms may favor reliance on 
widespread norms. Among sophisticated parties, however, potential network 
inefficiencies may be readily remedied through internalization of the posi­
tive externalities at work. Such parties have the resources necessary to 
finance the introduction of alternative networks of contract terms or shifts to 
available alternatives.8 Perhaps for this reason, competing networks of boi­
lerplate terms can be found within markets populated by sophisticated 
parties.9 With the availability of such an alternative, in tum, network effects 
necessarily constitute a more limited barrier to deviations from the prevail-. d d IO mg stan ar . 
While transaction-cost and network-effect theories surely offer some ex­
planation for sophisticated parties' reliance on conventional. usages or terms, 
6. This concept is echoed in the analysis of default rules in corporate law. In that context, 
many have questioned the significance of default rules given the ease with which drafting parties 
can tailor individually optimal terms. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political 
and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542 (1990). 
7. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. 
L. REV. 757 (1995); see also Ahdieh, supra note 3; Kahan & Klausner, Standardil,ation and Innova­
tion, supra note 2. 
8. By way of example, Kahan and Klausner have explored the role of underwriters and 
outside counsel in such internalization, while Gillian Hadfield and Eric Talley have considered the 
possibility of private production of corporate law. See Kahan & Klausner, Standardii.ation and Inno­
vation, supra note 2, at 736-40; Gillian Hadfield & Eric Talley, On Public Versus Private Provision 
of Corporate Law (Univ. of S. Cal. CLEO Research Paper No. C04-13; Univ. of S. Cal. L. & Econ., 
Research Paper No. 04-18, June 2004), http://ssrn.com/abstract=570641; see also S.J. Liebowitz & 
Stephen E. Margolis, Network Extemality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 1. EcoN. PERSP., Spr. 1994, at 
133, 141-42. 
9. The persistence of alternative networks of sovereign debt restructuring terms for much 
of the last century is a ready example. See Ahdieh, supra note 3, at 698-99; Choi & Gulati, supra 
note 2. 
10. Other explanations for the use of standardized terms have also been offered. Of particular 
note are network-related "learning effects," which arise from past use of given terms rather than 
their potential future use (as with network effects). See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 2, at 719-25. 
Particular implications of the latter might include a fear of inadvertently becoming subject to regula­
tion, based on use of a new contract term, and the greater potential for litigation around a less 
widely used (or at least less familiar) term, given existing precedent. Boilerplate might therefore be 
seen as offering greater control to the drafting party in shaping any future contract interpretation 
than would arise from any attempt to adjudicate the parties' intentions. In addition to such learning 
effects, inertia and related behavioral patterns have also been cited to explain the use of boilerplate. 
See Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of 
Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998). While each of these theories may 
explain some part of the use of boilerplate by sophisticated parties, further exploration may nonethe­
less be useful. 
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further attention to this pattern is in order. 11 Boilerplate may serve additional 
functions in bargaining among sophisticated parties-and perhaps even in 
contracting generally-than the above models suggest. 12 Specifically, I 
would supplement existing transaction-cost and network-effect theories with 
what I will term a "strategic" theory of boilerplate. 
A strategic conception of boilerplate begins with a sense of bargaining 
as characterized by both coordination and conflict. Thinking about bargain­
ing-whether in contracts or elsewhere-is often oriented to the dimensions 
of conflict between the parties. This is hardly surprising, given how much of 
what is interesting about the interaction of bargaining parties hinges on the 
divergences in their preferences, payoffs, and resulting strategies. In point of 
fact, however, the essential dynamic in bargaining is one of coordination. 
Contrary to the rhetoric sometimes used to describe bargaining, the ultimate 
goal is not to win but to agree. Agree on one's preferred terms, no doubt, but 1 3 agree nonetheless. 
Given the resulting mix of coordination and conflict in bargaining, it is 
necessary to think carefully about the nature of communication in contract 
negotiations. Although bargaining is-at some level-synonymous with 
communication, direct communication may not be the most effective tool in 
bargaining. Given a dimension of conflict, negotiating parties may rarely 
mean what they say or say what they mean. In the pursuit of coordination, 
then, alternative means of communication may be necessary.14 
Adherence to (or deviation from) the contracting norms of a given in­
dustry-which I construe as a form of boilerplate1 5-may serve just such 
communicative functions. Specifically, I consider two related but distinct 
1 1 . In this spirit, Todd Rakoff's exploration of potential theories behind the use and en­
forcement of form contracts deserves mention. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An 
Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1 17 4 ( 1983 ). 
12.  David Gilo and Ariel Porat have offered an extended enumeration of potential roles for 
boilerplate in the particular context of standard-form consumer contracts. See David Gilo & Ariel 
Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition of 
Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive Effects, I 04 MICH. L. REv. 983 
(2006). 
1 3. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. I do not mean to suggest that bargaining 
parties would prefer any agreement over a failure to agree. Naturally, agreement must fall within the 
contracting universe acceptable to both parties. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. The 
ultimate goal within any given negotiation, however, is to agree. 
14. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text; see also Robert B. Ahdieh, Law's Signal: 
A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transition, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 215,  239-41 (2004). 
1 5. It is not boilerplate in the sense of some particularly fixed language that is at issue 
herein, but rather the consistent inclusion of certain conventional contract provisions-contracting 
norms or standards of a sort. In slightly different terms, the present analysis might be seen as di­
rected to terms that are not negotiated by the parties but fixed for inclusion in advance of any 
negotiation. Cf Shmuel I. Becher, A Fresh Approach to the Long-Lasting Puzzle of Consumer Stan­
dard Form Contracts 8 (May 2005) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Yale Law School) (on file with 
author); Omri Ben-Shahar & John Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, Ft.A. ST. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 1-2, on file with author). Thus, the operative question presented 
herein is why sophisticated parties propose and incorporate certain conventional terms rather than 
tailoring more particularized terms. Most broadly, this can be understood as a question of standardi­
zation generally, including both its motivations and mechanisms. 
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functions that boilerplate may serve in contract bargaining, particularly 
among sophisticated parties but perhaps more generally as well. The first is 
a signaling function. In the case of boilerplate, however, the signal of inter­
est derives not from the substance of the relevant term but from its character 
as a standard rather than tailored term. Additionally, I consider potential 
coordination functions of boilerplate that rest on the nature of boilerplate as 
a focal point in bargaining.16 In this pair of signaling and coordination func­
tions, one might find the foundations of a strategic theory of boilerplate. 
What do I mean to capture with a strategic approach to boilerplate? In 
broad terms, the language of strategy calls attention to the potential use of 
boilerplate as a mechanism for parties to seek affirmative advantage in bar­
gaining.17 In this vein, I invoke recent Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling's 
seminal-if perhaps still inadequately appreciated-Strategy of Conflict, 
which explored strategic conduct as "conscious, intelligent, sophisticated 
conflict behavior [in contests the] participants . . .  try to 'win.' "18 
In emphasizing a sharply instrumental intent behind the use of boiler­
plate, I highlight strategy in a further sense. When boilerplate is used for 
strategic reasons, it concerns ends beyond the particular choice of terms. 
The intent of the party pressing boilerplate terms is divorced, at least in a 
direct sense, from the content of those terms. The strategic use of boilerplate 
is about something more than the content of the relevant term. 
Finally, the strategic analysis of boilerplate herein serves to call attention 
to an affirmative role for focal points in law. Focal points have been widely 
referenced in the legal literature but predominantly in what might be 
characterized as a passive form. In Schelling's terms, legal scholars have 
focused on the role of focal points in "tacit coordination"-situations in 
which conflict (as well as communication) is lacking.19 But the most 
significant role of focal points-including boilerplate terms-is strategic. 
Focal points do not simply exist; they can be created to help parties secure 
advantage in conflict and bargaining. In its attention to focal points, then, a 
16. Other strategic functions of boilerplate might be identified as well, although they are not 
emphasized herein. At least three potential "control" functions of boilerplate usage are noted infra, 
at notes 30, 142 & 144. 
17. Cf Gary Goodpaster, A Primer on Competitive Bargaining, 1 996 J. D1sr. REsoL. 325, 
326 (defining "competitive bargaining"). It bears noting, however, that just as simple contracts may 
not evidence an absence of "venality" or "self-interest" in contract negotiation, see Karen Eggleston, 
Eric A. Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity 
Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 9 1 ,  1 18-19 (2000), neither may the proposed use of standard terms. 
1 8. See SCHELLING, supra note 1 ,  at 3-4; see also Robert D. Cooter, Stephen Marks & 
Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 1 1  
J. LEGAL STUD. 225 ( 1 982); Richard K.  Neumann, Jr., On Strategy, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 299, 300 
( 1990) ("Strategy is the design of conflict. . .. [O]nce the potential for hostility arises, strategy is the 
process of structuring the conflict around the means for winning it."); cf Samuel R. Gross & Kent 
D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 
90 MICH. L. REV. 3 19, 328 ( 1 99 1 )  (referring to Mnookin and Kornhauser's notion of strategy as 
litigant behavior misrepresenting "intentions, desires, or chances of winning in order to obtain an 
advantage in settlement negotiations"); Robert H. Mnook:in & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 972-73 ( 1 979). 
1 9. See SCHELLING, supra note 1 ,  at 54, 57-58. 
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strategic analysis of boilerplate may have implications for legal analysis 
more generally. 
My analysis begins with an acknowledgement of the mixed-motive char­
acter of bargaining and suggestion of the resulting distortion of direct 
communication in contract negotiation. Parts II and III explore the pair of 
strategic functions noted above. The former considers the potential signaling 
functions of boilerplate in bargaining, exploring both more conventional 
signals of character and potential signals of group identity. The latter turns 
to the coordination functions of boilerplate. After further describing the na­
ture of bargaining as a coordination game and suggesting the resulting 
applicability of Schelling's focal point paradigm, I successively consider the 
potential role of boilerplate in both the presence and the absence of commu­
nication--cases of "explicit" and "tacit" bargaining. 
Part IV concludes by considering various implications of a strategic the­
ory of boilerplate. Among other implications, I posit that notions of 
bargaining power are necessarily altered within such a theory. Additionally, 
the approach I propose offers both descriptive and prescriptive lessons for 
the evolution of boilerplate and for expected bargaining patterns around boi­
lerplate. Finally, if boilerplate has the focal effects I describe, I suggest that 
the concerns associated with adhesion contracts may arise even in the pres­
ence of bargaining parity. 
Collectively, these implications offer important lessons for our under­
standing of contract barg3.ining. As a descriptive matter, the use of 
boilerplate by sophisticated pa,rt:ies may owe much to its strategic functions. 
Even where strategy has historically played little role in the use of boiler­
plate, however, the analysis and implications offered below suggest the 
value of greater strategic thinking among sophisticated parties in their use 
of boilerplate. 
I. CONFLICT, COORDINATION, AND COMMUNICATION IN BARGAINING 
In thinking about the dynamics of bargaining-whether contractual or 
otherwise-we commonly focus on the dimension of conflict in the relevant 
interaction. In this perspective, parties have divergent interests that drive 
their bargain with one another. Each hopes to bargain its way to a greater 
potential share of the contractual (or similar) surplus. To this end, the parties 
push, cajole, and otherwise negotiate with each other. 
In reality, however, the heart of bargaining is not conflict but coordina­
tion. 20 Bargaining parties' operative goal is to reach agreement. This requires 
terms to which both parties can agree-in essence, terms around which they 
can coordinate.21 This primacy of coordination is evident when we think 
20. I do not mean to suggest that conflict is Jacking in bargaining. Divergent preferences are 
no less essential to a dynamic of bargaining than the common goal of coordination. Without some 
such conflict, "bargaining" ceases to be worthy of the name. My point is merely to emphasize the 
more commonly overlooked dimension of coordination that is also at work. 
21. The subject of coordination, as I will elaborate infra, is the parties' expectations of one 
another. See Thomas C. Schelling, Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War, I CONFLICT 
March 2006) The Strategy of Boilerplate 1 039 
about the desired ends of contract negotiations as opposed to litigation. In 
bargaining, neither party seeks to crush its opponent. Notwithstanding 
sometimes loosely used rhetoric, neither aspires to a contract that is truly 
one-sided. Such a contract would, predictably, be rejected. Instead, each 
party wants the best deal that it can actually get.22 By contrast, the goal in 
litigation may be unvarnished victory; dismissal with prejudice is likely to 
be an attractive outcome to the civil defendant. 23 
If both coordination and conflict are present in bargaining, however, 
how do they actually play out? What is the balance of coordination and con­
flict in bargaining? B argaining, I would suggest, rests on parties' common 
goal of coordination; the path to that end, however, is littered by their tacti­
cal efforts to secure advantage. Thus, each party desires the best possible 
price; each wants its favored warranty terms, and the like. But each one only 
wants as much as it can have while still preserving the prospect of agree­
ment. On the playing field of bargaining, then, coordination is the goal, but 
the participants' successive plays are directed at securing advantage in suc­
cessive areas of conflict. 
This pattern is readily captured in game theory. Contract negotiation and 
other forms of bargaining are coordination games.24 The incentives of play­
ers thus favor the achievement of some coordination equilibrium.25 
Bargaining is not, however, a pure coordination game. As in the B attle of the 
Sexes, in which husband and wife wish to spend an evening together, but 
each prefers to spend it at a different venue, bargaining parties seek to agree, 
but would prefer to do so on their own terms.26 
Within this pattern, one must think carefully about the nature of com­
munication. Although I will offer an important caveat below-in the form of 
what Thomas Schelling termed "tacit bargaining"-bargaining is ordinarily 
grounded in communication. The nature of communication in bargaining, 
however, is shaped in important ways by the mixed motives at work. In light 
RESOL. 1 9, 20 ( 1 957); Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Sur­
vival: A Theory of Venture Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 45, 7 1 .  
22. Benjamin Franklin, perhaps unsurprisingly, put i t  well: 
Trades would not take place unless it were advantageous to the parties concerned. Of course, it 
is better to strike as good a bargain as one's bargaining position permits. The worst outcome is 
when, by overreaching greed, no bargain is struck, and a trade that could have been advanta­
geous to both parties does not come off at all. 
HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 33 ( 1 982) (quoting Franklin). 
23. Some concession to each side may be valued even in litigation, given its potential to 
diminish the prospect of appeal, to enhance the likelihood of voluntary compliance, and the like. 
24. "[T]he process of agreeing to a set of contractual terms is a coordination game." 
Eggleston et al., supra note 1 7, at 1 12; cf Rakoff, supra note 1 1 , at 1 222 (suggesting role of forrn 
contracts in facilitating coordination). 
25. See Utset, supra note 2 1 ,  at 71 -72 (describing coordination game dynamic in negotia­
tion, and potential for coordination failure: parties "may literally talk past each other and fail to 
reach a bargain"); see also F.H. Buckley, Three Theories of Substantive Fairness, 1 9  HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 33, 51 ( 1990); Philip B. Heymann, The Problem of Coordination: Bargaining and Rules, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 797 ( 1973). 
26. See Ahdieh, supra note 14, at 240 n. l 02. 
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of the element of conflict within the quest for coordination and, perhaps 
more significantly, the pervasive dimension of conflict in the negotiation of 
any single term, there is both more and less to communication in bargaining 
than we might otherwise imagine. 27 
Given a degree of conflict, in essence, ordinary communication may not 
serve the ends of coordination. Even if parties hope to achieve some coordi­
nation equilibrium, if they diverge as to their preferred equilibrium, the 
reliability of oral communication declines.28 I may neither mean what I say, 
nor say what I mean. In such circumstances, other means of communicating 
intentions, interests, and incentives, as well as other asymmetrically held 
information-means such as Schelling-style "focal points"-may be criti-
al 29 c . 
This is the backdrop for the present analysis. My inquiry concerns how 
both adherence to and deviation from boilerplate might serve a party's 
communicative goals in bargaining. Such goals may occasionally be of a 
mutually beneficial character. Thus, the relevant communication may serve 
to remedy Pareto suboptimal information asymmetries and thereby enhance 
the collective contracting surplus. At least as often, however, the communi­
cative impact of boilerplate may be intended to advance the particular 
interests of the drafter. In either case, the information communicated arises 
not primarily from the substance of the term proposed but from its character 
as either boilerplate or a tailored term. 30 
27. Cf Schelling, supra note 21, at 31-32 (suggesting that the line between explicit commu­
nication and tacit communication may be difficult to draw in the context of bargaining); David A. 
Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist Reimagination, 92 GEO. 
L.J. 61, 119-20 (2003). On the whole, the function of communication in bargaining rests on the 
premise of information asymmetries of one variety or another. 
28. See Ahdieh, supra note 1 4, at 239-41. 
29. See SCHELLING, supra note I, at 112. On the difficulties of relying on communication, 
see Goodpaster, supra note I 7, at 342-43 (''The information the competitive negotiator seeks is the 
other party's bottom line. How much he will maximally give or minimally accept to make a deal. On 
the other hand, the competitive negotiator wants to persuade the other side about the firmness of the 
negotiator's own asserted bottom line. The competitive negotiator works to convince the other party 
that it will settle only at some point that is higher (or lower, as the case may be) than its actual and 
unrevealed bottom line."). 
30. Beyond the signaling and coordination functions I explore herein, one might also posit 
an "agency control" function of sorts. Principals might use boilerplate to control their agents. This 
has been suggested with reference to form contracts by numerous authors. See, e.g., Avery Wiener 
Katz, On the Use of Practitioner Surveys in Commercial Law Research, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2760, 
2769 (2000); cf Thomas C. Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 AM. EcoN. REV. 281, 287-88 
(1956) (suggesting utility of reliance on agent in limiting expectations of any potential deviation by 
the principal). By dictating the inclusion of certain terms in one's contracts up front, and thereby 
foreclosing negotiation of these terms, corporate entities may constrain the discretion available to 
their agents. This can occur both through the requirement of certain process boilerplate or the dicta­
tion of substantive terms. In the former case, one might point to the standard inclusion of a merger 
clause and a no-oral-modification clause. See Rakoff, supra note I I, at I 223-24. Substantively, 
corporate entities might dictate the inclusion of particular substantive terms such as a unanimous 
action clause. 
Such control of agents may be especially important for the sophisticated contracting parties of 
interest herein. See Ben-Shahar & White, supra note 2, at 967-68; Stewart Macaulay, Private Legis­
lation and the Duty to Read-Business by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Canis, 19 
VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1059 ( 1966); cf Becher, supra note 15, at 9 (describing constraints imposed on 
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11. THE SIGNALING FUNCTIONS OF BOILERPLATE 
Boilerplate may facilitate important signaling functions in contract bar­
gaining. Signaling involves the communication of information that cannot 
be effectively communicated through explicit statements of intention or 
character.31 The offering of a warranty, for example, communicates private 
information in the hands of the manufacturer regarding the character of the 
product (or the character of the manufacturer), which could not be commu­
nicated by explicit assurances of product quality alone.32 
agents by standard-form agreements). Sophisticated parties might thus wish to adopt a firm com­
mitment to certain boilerplate terms in order to more effectively constrain the discretion of their 
agents in contract negotiations. Cf Eggleston et al., supra note 17, at 110-12. Large institutions­
with concomitantly large numbers of agents and concomitantly wide discretion in the hands of those 
agents-might have particular need for a mechanism to constrain the discretion of those charged 
with negotiating their many contractual obligations. The required use of certain boilerplate in all 
contracts, or all contracts of a particular variety, might essentially be seen to serve this purpose. See 
Rakoff, supra note 11 at 1 223 (suggesting effectiveness of corporate hierarchy as only theory of 
enforceability of adhesion contracts: "In private organizations, as in public bureaucracies, discretion 
is power-and this is true of discretion at the bottom of the hierarchy as well as at the top."); see 
also Macaulay, supra, at 1 059. 
Such use of boilerplate as a mechanism of constraint might be seen to apply most directly to 
those employees of the relevant institution who are responsible for contract negotiations. P erhaps 
even more significantly, however, it may apply to external agents, including outside counsel. The 
latter may be especially prone to deviation from the principal 's aims for any number of reasons. To 
begin with, they have an incentive to minimize costs, potentially favoring distinct standardized terms 
or contracts. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: 
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 353-55 (1996) 
(describing potential for agents to favor standardized terms). Additionally, and following directly 
from this, external agents may have their own preferred drafting models. Finally, outside counsel's 
potentially greater repeat player character in a given market, as well as relatively greater autonomy 
from the principal (as compared to other internal agents), may also increase the relative utility of 
boilerplate as a mechanism of control of outside agents. 
Claire Hill's analysis of the use of "The Form" in large-firm legal practice calls further atten­
tion to attorneys' own agendas in contract design. See Hill, supra note 2, at 62�3. Boilerplate-based 
constraints on counsel might also be seen as a cost-saving device. See Eggleston et al., supra note 
17, at 1 20. Similar arguments, in tum, can be made about investment bank agents in corporate fi­
nance. Kahan and Klausner's treatment of the independent role of investment banks in facilitating 
contract standardization can thus be understood as a story of agency costs. See Kahan & Klausner, 
Standardization and Innovation, supra note 2, at 755. A slightly different example, of course, arises 
when companies rely on form contracts including a merger clause for use by their sales agents. See 
Rakoff, supra note 11, at 1223. 
31. "A signal is a costly behavior that can communicate information about the sender when 
the receiver knows that only senders with a particular characteristic can afford, or are willing, to 
send the signal." David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 879, 882-83 (2003); see also Steven Hetcher, Changing the Social Meaning of Privacy in 
Cyberspace, 15 HARV. J.L. & TucH. 149, 193 (2001) (noting that signals can potentially arise either 
from words or deeds). 
32. See Hetcher, supra note 31, at 193; Avery Wiener Katz, The Option Element in Contract­
ing, 90 VA. L. REV. 2 1 87, 2222 (2004). The signaling role of boilerplate in bargaining that I propose 
echoes analysis of the impact of default rules on bargaining. See, e.g. , Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, 
Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, IOI YALE L.J. 729 
(1 992); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default 
Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 6 1 5, 617  ( 1 990). 
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A .  Signaling Character 
Signaling is most commonly conceived to communicate information re­
garding the character of a party, transaction, or product.33 Signals might 
offer information regarding the reliability, viability, or capacity of a poten­
tial trading partner, or the costs or risks of a particular deal.34 Such 
communications may enhance either collective contracting efficiency or a 
particular party's share of the contractual surplus. Signals may play an espe­
cially significant role in doing so where direct communication is 
undermined by the presence of some degree of conflict, as in contract nego­
tiations and other bargaining dynamics.35 
The present argument is distinct from ordinary treatments of signaling, 
as the signal of interest herein arises not from the substance of the term of­
fered36 but from the proposed term's consistency with or deviation from the 
preexisting contracting norm.37 When a warranty is conceived as a signal of 
product quality, the notion is that the manufacturer's willingness to stand 
behind the product communicates private information regarding the prod­
uct's reliability. Likewise, a signaling conception of unanimous action 
clauses in sovereign debt instruments posits that they communicate a 
debtor's commitment to avoid default.38 Here, by contrast, the notion is that 
the adoption of or the failure to adopt a standard term-whether it be a war­
ranty or warranty disclaimer, or a unanimous action clause or collective 
action clause--communicates certain information, independent of the sub-
f h . . 39 stance o t e prov1s10n. 
33. "One detects signals attributed to general character traits, such as responsiveness, de­
pendability, and honesty." Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting on the Internet, 81 B. U. L. 
REV. 457, 464 (2001) (footnote omitted). The signaling function is widely relied on in the law and 
economics literature to describe behavior intended to communicate information regarding the char­
acter or nature of a particular individual, institution, or product. See ERIC A. PosNER, LAW AND 
SOCIAL NORMS 18-19 (2000). 
34. See Eggleston et al., supra note 17, at 117; see also Ruben Kraiem, Leaving Money on 
the Table: Contract Practice in a Low-Trust Environment, 42 Cot.UM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 715, 736 
n.31 (2004) ("[P]eople will behave in a trustworthy manner, or comply with a given set of social 
norms, simply for fear of incurring reputational or other social sanctions . . . .  [T]here is a signaling 
component to one's behavior, independent of whether one has or has not internalized the relevant 
norm. "). 
35. See supra Part I. 
36. Omri Ben-Shahar and John Pottow characterize this as the "direct value " of the relevant 
term. See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 15, at 3. 
37. With an eye to default rules, Ben-Shahar and Pottow have made analogous observations 
regarding the signaling effects of standard terms and offered potential examples of this pattern. See 
id. 
38. See William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest 
of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. I, 52 (2004 ); Choi & Gulati, supra note 2, at 939. 
39. The notion of boilerplate signaling I suggest is directly in line with Ayres and Gertner's 
suggestion that a party may adhere to a suboptimal default rule in order to conceal private informa­
tion regarding the subject matter of the relevant term. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 32; see also 
Eggleston et al., supra note 17, at 109-10. As Korobkin suggests, however, adherence may also be 
motivated by a desire to conceal information independent of the relevant term. See Russell Korob­
kin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 620 (1998). 
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As explored in the legal literature, signals might generally be grouped 
into affirmative words or deeds designed to signal information regarding the 
speaker or actor, and statements or moves by a party designed to elicit re­
sponsive signals from another party. By dint of certain standard or 
conventional commitments, a party can effectively signal that it will be a 
suitable contracting partner.40 Conversely, but still strategically, a party may 
also rely on the proposed use of boilerplate to elicit signals from its negoti­
ating counterpart about the latter's character. In these successive cases, the 
proposed use of boilerplate might respectively be said to produce pooling 
and separating equilibria. 
1. Affirmative Signals 
The proposed use of boilerplate may produce a pooling effect of sorts in 
speaking to the character of the proposing party or the transaction it pro­
poses.41 A willingness to rely on boilerplate terms might be seen to signal 
the absence of any elevated risk of default, litigation, or the like, or the ab­
sence of flaws in the particular transaction under consideration.42 Thus, a 
party proposing boilerplate would seem to place itself and the relevant 
transaction at some median level of risk.43 In other terms, the proposed use 
of boilerplate could be seen to signal the absence of private information ad­
verse to the potential counterparty.44 In essence, it signals the absence of any 
undisclosed reason for standard terms to be less attractive to the relevant 
party. 
Business covenants in both indentures and private loan agreements sug­
gest potential examples. The absence of covenants ordinarily included in a 
particular type of debt instrument-including certain debt and investment 
40. Naturally, a party may also signal its lack of reliability. See Jeffrey Evans Stake & Mi­
chael Grossberg, Roundtable: Opportunities for and Limitations of Private Ordering in Family Law, 
73 IND. L.J. 535, 539 (1998) (discussing signaling problem inherent in suggesting entry into prenup­
tial agreement). 
41. See Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Nonns, and Economic Meth­
odology, 110 YALE L.J. 625 (2001) (book review); see also Hetcher, supra note 31, at 195 ("To 
distinguish themselves from bad types, good types engage in actions that are called 'signals.' Signals 
reveal type if only the good types, and not the bad types, can afford to send them, and everyone 
knows this."). 
42. See Lisa Bernstein, Social Nonns and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDisc. L.J. 
59, 7 1 -72 (1993); Korobkin, supra note 39, at 621; Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: 
Fann, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1165 n.213 (2003). Lisa Bernstein has spoken 
of the "relational costs" of deviation from a norm. Such costs might arguably be greater among the 
sophisticated, repeat player parties of interest herein. Cf Bernstein, supra, at 74. 
43. See Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do as Much with 
Fewer Words?, 79 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 889, 899 (2004) ("[E]ach party needs to expend costs to con­
vince the other party that it is not using strategic handles itself."). 
44. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 32. As Ayres and Gertner's default rules analysis makes 
clear, the strategic use of boilerplate may potentially work both in the affirmative and in the nega­
tive. The proposed use of boilerplate may not only help signal positive information but also may 
serve to conceal adverse information. 
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covenants45-would likely constitute an important adverse signal to credi­
tors. One can appreciate as much with respect to the various types of event 
risk covenants, as used in the aftermath of the 1988 leveraged buyout of 
RJR Nabisco. At the outset, limited hostile control change covenants­
strongly favorable to management interests-were the norm.46 Relatively 
quickly, however, more generally advantageous dual trigger covenants 
emerged as the standard.47 On these facts, some adverse signal might be ex­
pected to arise from an issuer's continued use of the older standard. 
Additionally, however, early shifts to the newer standard may have offered a 
signal of private information regarding greater prospects of hostile takeover 
activity, given a correlation between use of dual trigger covenants and such 
activity.48 In the design of the particular event risk covenant used, moreover, 
further signals might be found, as with the inclusion of a more limited col­
lection of triggering events than was conventional-for example, the 
exclusion of a change in board composition--or the offering of a less-than-
standard remedy. 49 
As suggested by the foregoing examples, the bargaining opportunity sets 
most suited to boilerplate's signaling effects are binary in nature. The starker 
a choice-as in the choice between hostile control change and dual trigger 
event risk covenants-the clearer the relevant signal.50 By contrast, the coor­
dination functions of boilerplate are at their acme when bargaining parties 
face an array of contracting altematives.51 
As the examples offered also suggest, the relevant boilerplate signal may 
often have some significant temporal feature. The choice between hostile 
control change and dual trigger event risk covenants involved a shift in the 
contractual norm over time.52 Early movers offered one signal. Late movers 
offered another. One might further expect that a pattern of early or late 
45. See Marcel Kahan & David Yennack, Investment Opportunities and the Design of Debt 
Securities, 14 J. L. EcoN. & ORG. 136, 1 42 ( 1998). 
46. See Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds, supra note 2, at 952. 
47. See id. at 955. 
48. See id. at 975-76. 
49. In the case of anti-dilution provisions, similarly, some broad signal might be offered by a 
debtor's election to use the older conversion price standard versus a newer market price term. Such a 
choice might be expected to signal a relatively narrower conception of the anti-dilution function. See 
Bratton, supra note 2, at 687 n.76; Stanley A. Kaplan, Pierr:ing the Corporate Boilerplate: Anti­
Dilution Clauses in Convertible Securities, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 29 (1965); see also AM. BAR 
FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURES 530 ( 1971) [hereinafter COMMENTARIES]. More specifi­
cally, private information pointing to heightened risk in a transaction might be signaled by the use of 
a full ratchet provision for calculating conversion price. Such provisions are thus used primarily for 
riskier transactions or amidst economic turmoil. See Woronoff & Rosen, supra note 5, at 1 47. 
50. See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 15, at 15-16, 2 1 ;  cf Ayres & Gertner, supra note 
32, at 739; Korobkin, supra note IO, at 1598. 
5 1 .  See infra note 140. 
52. See Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds, supra note 2. Another exam­
ple of a shift in boilerplate over time, giving rise to similar signaling patterns, was the disappearance 
of debt covenants and restrictions on subsequent liens and dividends from the debt instruments of 
large corporations between the 1970s and the mid- I 980s, and their replacement by negative pledge 
covenants against added secured debt and by prohibitions on the sale and leaseback of assets. 
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shifts in boilerplate usages would offer its own, distinct signal. While not all 
boilerplate signals will have this character, one might expect some temporal 
element to often be present in complex contracting, with its gradual shifts in 
boilerplate over time.53 
Most importantly, however, as to each of the above examples, it is essen­
tial to appreciate a signal of interest that is entirely independent of the 
substance of the relevant provision.54 While the substantive choice of term 
offers some signal on its merits, it also offers a distinct signal as boilerplate 
or deviation from boilerplate. This becomes clearer when we consider the 
range of potential proposals to deviate from boilerplate, with changes ad­
verse to the non-drafting party at one end of the spectrum (and suggested by 
the examples above), and changes of seeming benefit to the non-drafting 
party at the other. In the case of adverse deviations from boilerplate, both 
the abandonment of a norm and the substantive shift to a less favorable term 
communicate a negative signal to the other party. Minimally, the deviation 
from boilerplate to offer less favorable terms enhances the strength of the 
substantive adverse signal. 
When one considers proposed deviations that are seemingly beneficial to 
the non-drafting party, however, this correlation disappears. In the choice 
between a hostile control change or a dual trigger form of event risk cove­
nant, for example, it bears noting that a relatively uncommon third form­
highly favorable to creditors-was also available. Pure rating decline cove­
nants-triggered by any rating decline, regardless of cause--deviated from 
boilerplate, yet offered much more favorable terms to the non-drafting 
party. 55 
In such circumstances, the distinction between the signal arising from 
boilerplate deviation and that arising from the substantive choice of term 
emerges more starkly. Given such divergence, however, there is at least the 
prospect that even a favorable deviation from boilerplate could constitute an 
adverse signal.56 This may simply be an issue of raising suspicions regarding 
the reason for the deviation-suspicions not susceptible to alleviation 
53.  Cf Korobkin, supra note 10. 
54. In their analysis, Ben-Shahar and Pottow are occasionally ambiguous in drawing the line 
between what they term the "direct value" signaled by a given term, and the signal arising from its 
character as a boilerplate or tailored term. See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 15 ,  at 1 2-13 .  
55 .  See Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds, supra note 2, a t  958-60. An­
other example of this pattern might be an issuer's use of the less borrower-friendly terms of the 
original, 1 983 Model Simplified Indenture ("MSI''), rather than the 1 999 revision. The persistence 
of obligations subsequent to a sale of assets under Section 5.01 of the 1983 MSI, and their elimina­
tion under Section 5.02 of the 1999 version, might constitute a particular example. Compare Model 
Simplified Indenture, 38  Bus. LAW. 741 , 755 (1 983) (section 5.01 ), with Revised Model Simplified 
Indenture, 55 Bus. LAW. 1 1 15, 1 135 (2000) (section 5.02). 
56. See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 15 ,  at 2-3; Gilo & Porat, supra note 1 2; Hill, 
supra note 2, at 69 (noting that even improvements in "The Form" may constitute negative signal); 
cf Korobkin, supra note 39. Eggleston, Posner, and Zeckhauser suggest that even the addition of 
language "to protect the other against one's own opportunism" may constitute an adverse signal. See 
Eggleston et al., supra note 1 7, at 1 1 8-19. At the extreme, one might conceive of below-market 
offers to sell or offers to buy at a premium in this light. Attractive as they may be, such offers may 
also raise questions. See, e.g., id. at 109-10. 
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through communication, given the mixed motives in play. Among the so­
phisticated parties of interest in the present analysis, this possibility may be 
especially significant. Proposed deviations from boilerplate by unsophisti­
cated or unrepresented parties might be written off as devoid of any 
meaningful signal. By contrast, a sophisticated party and its even more so­
phisticated counsel are more likely to intend something when they deviate 
from standard terms.57 When made by counsel, seemingly favorable devia­
tions from the norm may be more likely to be interpreted as craftiness than 
as simple concession. 
Notably, such adverse signaling may arise even from the most minimal 
of deviations. 58 Even small changes raise the question, "Why?" Perhaps 
more importantly, small changes may raise questions as to what further 
changes are hidden within ''The Form."59 The selection of particular terms 
from the less borrower-friendly 1983 Model Simplified Indenture ("MSI"), 
for example, rather than the revised 1999 MSI, might trigger concerns about 
the entire range of choices made in the relevant indenture.6() 
One might also appreciate the adverse signals attending even favorable 
deviations from boilerplate within a private information framework. As sug­
gested above, the proposed use of boilerplate might be seen to signal a lack 
of private information. Deviations toward terms less favorable to the non­
drafting party, by contrast, might suggest the presence of such information. 
The proposal of non-boilerplate terms favorable to the other party, however, 
is no different. It still signals private information; it is simply favorable in­
formation. Yet such indication of private information may raise concern 
about the presence of other private information.61 Stating it differently, it 
may raise questions about why the party offering the favorable term cannot 
compete effectively with standard market terms. Why might the party need 
to offer a premium? Going a step further, the deviation from boilerplate to 
offer preferred terms might be seen to indicate an unwillingness or perhaps 
inability to be subject to the market. Such an offer might signal a party too 
anxious to make a deal. Use of a rare, pure rating decline event risk cove­
nant might be expected to trigger such an adverse response, alongside its 
substantive signal of creditworthiness. 62 
57. See Hill & King, supra note 43, at 899 (describing negotiations among sophisticated 
parties of verbiage to be used in contract as searches for "strategic handles or ambiguities that the 
other party might exploit"). 
58. Cf Eggleston et al., supra note 1 7, at 109-10 (noting employer's potential offer of higher 
sales commission as signal of private information of low sales). 
59. See Hill, supra note 2, at 72, 79 (suggesting worries about adverse signaling may deter 
even obvious improvements in the forms utilized within large law firms, let alone innovations). 
60. See supra note 55. 
61. See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 15, at 17 (describing challenge of "unknown un­
knowns"); see also id. at 19 (suggesting suspicions likely to arise from deviations from default 
rules); Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1825 (2000). 
62. Elimination of the standard contractual disclaimer of consequential damages would be to 
similar effect. Cf Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 
1 227, 1270-71 & n.205 (2003). 
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Aside from its adverse or positive effect, favorable deviations from boi­
lerplate might also signal particular understandings or conceptions of the 
drafting party. Anti-dilution provisions in corporate debt, for example, have 
been conceptualized in a variety of ways.63 By offering anti-dilution terms 
more favorable than the norm, a party might signal its particular understand­
ing of the nature of anti-dilution protections. 
In the broadest terms, even favorable deviations from boilerplate may 
simply call attention to the relevant drafting party or the deal it proposes. 
Such heightened attention may sometimes be favorable, but may also be 
unwelcome. This does not mean, of course, that any deviation from boiler­
plate, no matter how favorable, will constitute an adverse signal in toto. 
Rather, when the substantive change in term is sufficiently favorable, the 
attendant benefits are likely to drown out any negative signal that the devia­
tion from boilerplate sends. Deviations from the contracting norm may be 
problematic, by contrast, where they offer only limited substantive benefit to 
a counterparty. 
Finally, the foregoing may suggest the possibility of thinking about the 
role of boilerplate in bargaining in somewhat distinct terms from those de­
scribed above. As already pointed out with reference to disadvantageous 
deviations from boilerplate, the abandonment of a standard term may mini­
mally strengthen the force of the substantive adverse signal. Similarly, when a 
party proposes favorable deviations from boilerplate, the boilerplate's function 
might be to establish a negotiating benchmark against which the deviations 
will more strongly communicate a positive signal. In this conception, the af­
firmative functions of boilerplate in bargaining can arise from adherence or 
from deviation. Once boilerplate sets a baseline, in essence, favorable devia­
tions from it-for example, a debtor's election of a pure rating decline 
covenant or use of the original MSI-may offer an even clearer positive sig­
nal. As I will suggest below, then, a repeat player might be seen to benefit 
from defining a relevant contracting norm distant from its reservation point 
not only for substantive reasons, but also to ensure its consistent ability to 
offer favorable deviations from the norm and a resulting positive signal.64 
2. Responsive Signals 
Each of the foregoing aspects of boilerplate's signaling functions 
arises similarly in the use of boilerplate not to disseminate information but 
to elicit it. Just as the proposed use of boilerplate may trigger a pooling 
equilibrium of sorts by suggesting a median level of risk and lack of pri­
vate information in the hands of the drafting party, it may also produce a 
63. See supra note 49. 
64. See infra Section IV.B. Again, it bears recalling that the utility of-and perhaps the need 
for-such signals derives from the limits on direct communication in bargaining, given the presence 
of some dimension of conflict alongside an operative dynamic of coordination. See supra Part I. 
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separating equilibrium of sorts. In essence, it may permit the identification 
of more risky counterparties or transactions.65 
A party may be a less attractive contracting partner for a variety of rea­
sons, including a relatively greater propensity for default or tendency to 
litigate upon default.66 When a party resists proposed boilerplate, the draft­
ing party may be signaled of some such greater risk. The median contracting 
party might be expected to be amenable to standardized terms. By contrast, 
a party more at risk of default or more prone to litigation is more likely to 
seek particularized terms pertaining to such contingencies.67 
Others have discussed this possibility, though primarily with reference 
to the use of standard-form contracts of adhesion.68 In this line of analysis, 
the use of adhesion contracts can be understood as a means to discoura�e 
higher-risk counterparties from contracting or to force such parties to reveal 
their risk profiles.69 Yet the same principle may operate more broadly ; it may 
play out with form contracts generally. Under the present analysis, it may 
arise from any proposed use of the contracting norm, even within generally 
non-standardized contracts. As to such terms, some signaling of adverse 
information regarding a potential contracting partner may obtain from that 
partner 's desire to deviate from proposed boilerplate.70 
Here, a binary dimension to the choice between the standard term and 
the alternative is likely to be even more relevant than with the affirmative 
signals discussed previously.71 In the case of responsive signals, furthermore, 
65. See Gilo & Porat, supra note 12, at 988-89, 990-92. 
66. See Richard Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 Tux. L. REv. 
1581, 1586 (2005) ("[O]ne reason sellers will not negotiate with consumers over changes to a form 
contract . . .  may be that the consumer who asks to negotiate signals to the seller that he may be 
litigious, or otherwise a troublemaker"); cf Kristin Madison, Government, Signaling, and Social 
Norms, 2001 U. ILL L. REV. 867, 875 (suggesting range of information about partner that might be 
effectively signaled). 
67. See Eggleston et al., supra note 1 7, at 110 (A party "will be less suspicious if the pro­
posed contract is a standard contract, rather than one ostensibly tailored to today's individual 
circumstances, because a simple standard contract, which applies to heterogeneous circumstances, is 
less likely to exploit individualized asymmetric information . . . .  Therefore, asymmetry of informa­
tion may lead parties to use equivalent contracts over a broad range of circumstances, even 
though optimality would require heterogeneous and context-specific contracts."). In the-perhaps 
unlikely-alternative, a willingness to accept boilerplate without revision might also be seen to 
signal a prospect of gross default, and consequent disinterest in dickering over contract terms. The 
responsive signal elicited by the proposed use of boilerplate may consequently be inflected with 
some degree of noise. 
68. See, e.g. , Paul Watford, Contractual Liability in Intellectual Property Disputes-A Case 
Study: Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 269, 277-78 ( 1994) 
(discussing negotiation options for parties faced with adhesion contracts). 
69. See Eggleston et al., supra note 17, at 109-10. 
70. This pattern might be readily captured by boilerplate provisions for the non-assumption 
of debts and liabilities in the case of an asset sale. A counterparty's resistance to such a provision 
may signal the presence of hidden debts or liabilities. Standard provisions providing for the arbitra­
tion of disputes might also be a relevant example. In this case, demand for authority to pursue other 
means of legal recourse might signal a greater likelihood of, or at least a greater willingness to en­
gage in, dispute. See Korobkin, supra note 62, at 1 270 & n.205. 
7 1 .  See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
March 2006) The Strategy of Boilerplate 1 049 
the signal attaches even less to the substance of the deviation demanded by 
the non-drafting party than to the very demand for deviation. This is evident 
with respect to favorable deviations sought by non-drafting parties. In the 
latter case, the non-drafting party is not writing on a clean slate. Rather, it 
has before it a boilerplate provision drafted by its counterparty. To affirma­
tively reject the boilerplate term and demand a deviation harmful to one's 
substantive interests would be expected to raise all the suspicions outlined 
above, yet even more forcefully.72 
B. Signaling Group Identity 
Besides providing evidence of the character of a party or the nature of a 
particular transaction, signals may provide other types of information. 73 For 
instance, the use of certain boilerplate might be the norm for a particular 
type of actor or group. A party's proposed use of that boilerplate, then, 
might help to signal its identity74 or group membership.75 
An example of this pattern-in which the choice of particular boilerplate 
signals information regarding the type of drafting party-might be the stan­
dard use of one or the other of two alternative boilerplate terms to govern 
alterations in the financial terms of sovereign debt contracts.76 Bond con­
tracts issued under English law have historically included a standardized 
provision requiring the consent of a supermajority of bondholders for any 
change.77 Sovereign bonds issued under New York law, by contrast, included 
a standard term requiring the unanimous consent of all bondholders.78 The 
use of one boilerplate term or the other thus helped signal that the contract 
was an English-law or New York-law bond. More significantly, it was seen 
as some signal of the grouping of the borrower within the category of either 
72. One might reasonably predict that the strategic payoff from the invocation of boilerplate 
as a signaling device would be characterized by diminishing returns. Over time, the information to 
be offered or elicited through boilerplate usage is likely to be discounted through some internaliza­
tion of the potential returns from any such strategic use of boilerplate. In the presence of significant 
information asymmetries, however, some significant-even if diminished-signaling effect might 
nonetheless persist. The noise in the information signaled would necessarily increase as negotiators 
absorb the utility of strategic behavior. Even then, however, it may constitute the best information 
available. 
73. See Eggleston et al., supra note 1 7, at 109-10. For example, in the context of trade se­
crets, "[a]n important function of security measures is to signal to competitors and the public what 
information belongs to the business." Jermaine S. Grubbs, Comment, Give the Little Guys Equal 
Opportunity at Trade Secret Protection: Why the "Reasonable Efforts " Taken by Small Businesses 
Should Be Analyzed Less Stringently, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. R.Ev. 42 1 ,  429 (2005). 
74. For example, proposing use of the model swap agreement of the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association offers some signal of the proposing party's conception of itself. 
75. Howard Abrams has suggested a reading of Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Interna­
tional Sales Corp. , 190 F. Supp. 1 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1 960), as involving a signaling of group membership 
by the contracting parties. 
76. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
77. See Ahdieh, supra note 3, at 698. 
78. See id. at 698-700; Choi & Gulati, supra note 2, at 938. 
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low-risk or high-risk debtors.79 For this reason, emerging market debt was 
commonly issued in New York.80 By issuing in New York, higher-risk debtors 
sought to signal their preferred inclusion within the grouping of lower-risk 
debtors, who could more readily afford a unanimous action requirement and 
its greater constraints on their future ability to restructure their debt.81 
Although a less familiar signaling paradigm, such signaling of group 
identity may offer an even clearer case of the signaling effects of boilerplate. 
When some sufficient consistency can be observed between particular pro­
visions and the users of those provisions, boilerplate may serve an important 
classification function. 
In sum, some signaling function may be an important element in the 
strategic use of boilerplate. In essence, by proposing the use of boilerplate, a 
bargaining party may convey certain information regarding the character 
and relative risks of the party itself and the proposed transaction. A party 
may also be able to extract valuable information regarding its counterparty. 
Finally, in appropriate circumstances, boilerplate may help to communicate 
identity. In each of these ways, the use of boilerplate may serve important 
. f . 82 expressive unctions. 
Ill. THE COORDINATION FUNCTIONS OF BOILERPLATE 
The use of boilerplate in bargaining may play an important role in facili­
tating agreement at an equilibrium favorable to a particular party. Because 
of the multiple equilibrium dynamic of bargaining, some extrinsic mecha­
nism will often be needed to define the parties' ultimate point of agreement. 
79. Cf Ahdieh, supra note 3, at 707 (discussing concern among debtor states that changes to 
standard bond terms to make restructuring easier might increase borrowing costs or exclude debtor 
nations from international debt markets). 
80. See id. at 698-700. 
8 1 .  Other examples of boilerplate terms indicative of group identity might also be offered. A 
simple case might be the inclusion of a certain type of certified warranty, distinct to a particular 
group of assertedly "high-quality " producers. In the case of debt instruments, the consistent inclu­
sion of business covenants in junk bonds and their consistent exclusion from investment-grade 
bonds in the 1 980s, see William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: legal Theory in a 
Time of Restructuring, 1 989 DuKE L.J. 92, 140 & n.2 1 1 ,  made the presence of such covenants an 
effective signal regarding the nature of the relevant issuer. An even clearer example might be the 
early move to dual trigger covenants, a signal potentially placing the relevant issuer in a category of 
issuers prone to hostile takeover. See Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds, supra 
note 2, at 975. To similar effect would be the inclusion in a convertible security of anti-dilution 
provisions directed to information barriers, which provisions are used primarily by private compa­
nies and public companies with thin trading. See Woronoff & Rosen, supra note 5, at 133.  Yet 
another example mentioned above would be the use of full ratchet anti-dilution provisions, with the 
attendant implication of the relative riskiness of the issuer. See id. at 145-47. Finally, following 
from Kahan and Yermack's analysis of the use of covenants in convertible debt securities, one might 
construct the presence of covenants as a classificatory signal of sorts. See Kahan & Yermack, supra 
note 45, at 142-44. 
82. See SCHELLING, supra note 2, at 1 15. The term "expressive" is one that Schelling himself 
used. Id. It has since been popularized in the legal literature. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & 
Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 
(2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 202 1 ( 1996). 
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In this exercise in coordination, boilerplate may offer a "focal point" of 
sorts, facilitating resolution of the game. 
A. Conflict and Coordination in Bargaining 
As described at the outset, contract bargaining is fairly understood as a 
type of coordination game.83 Characteristic of such games is the presence of 
multiple equilibria. Rather than a single stable solution, an array of potential 
outcomes, once reached, exhibit significant stability. 84 Bargaining parties 
might thus reach myriad potential deals over any individual term of their 
agreement or the agreement as a whole.85 
How, then, do parties solve the coordination game of contract bargain­
ing? Three scenarios present themselves, assuming each party has some 
range of acceptable outcomes, from its ideal outcome (that is, near-complete 
capitulation by the counterparty) to its "reservation point"-the least favor­
able outcome the party would be willing to accept.86 Given the existence of 
such a range for each bargaining party, the first possibility is no overlap. In 
this case, there is no game at all, as the parties simply cannot agree.87 Next, 
there is the possibility that the parties' bargaining ranges abut one another. 
In this scenario, of course, only one equilibrium is common to both parties. 
If that point can be identified in bargaining, contracting will occur; other­
wise, it will not. Again, however, there is no game.88 
It is only when the parties' bargaining ranges overlap that multiple equi­
libria and a resulting game of coordination emerges.89 In numerical terms, 
one can imagine a party on one side who is willing to sell for any price 
greater than $4.00. The buyer, meanwhile, is willing to take the item for free 
or to pay anything up to $6.00. In this dynamic, any price between $4.00 
83. See supra Part I .  
84. This multiple equilibrium dynamic in coordination games is often contrasted with the 
more familiar pattern of the Prisoner's Dilemma. While players' incentives favor defection in the 
Prisoner's Dilemma, no player can be expected to deviate from the equilibrium achieved in a coor­
dination game. See Ahdieh, supra note 1 4, at 230. 
85. If all contract terms are efficiently priced, see Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, 
Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 203, 1 209-10 (2003), it 
bears noting that the implications of non-price negotiations are necessarily limited. Yet any number 
of constraints, including bounded rationality, see id. at 1222-25, and asymmetric information, may 
limit such contracting efficiency. Further, asymmetric valuations-including asymmetric risk pref­
erences-may also create some enhanced utility from the negotiation of particular contract terms. 
See Korobk:in, supra note 61 ,  at 1 8 1 3-14. 
86. I borrow the terms of the negotiating process-"reservation point," "bargaining zone," 
"commitment point," and "deal point" -from Russell Korobkin. See Korobkin, supra note 6 1 ,  at 
1 792, 1 794. 
87. See Mnook:in & Kornhauser, supra note 1 8, at 975. 
88. But see Schelling, supra note 30, at 292 n.6. 
89. See Ahdieh, supra note 1 4, at 235. 
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and $6.00-any point within the parties' "bargaining zone"-should induce 90 agreement. 
But on what price-at what "deal point"-will the parties actually 
agree? Along the undifferentiated scale from $4.00 to $6.00, anything is 
possible, including a failure to contract.91 If some point of agreement is to be 
reached, however, bargaining power is generally expected to define it. In 
essence, one would predict a solution at, or at least relatively closer to, the 
preferred outcome of the party most capable of resisting concessions.92 In 
the terms of the Rubenstein bargaining solution, for example, the party with 
greater capacity for patience-the party facing lower costs of delay-will 
likely secure a price closest to its preferred result.93 
Yet why is $6.00 the deal point dictated by a dominant seller's bargain­
ing power rather than $5.00? In essence, this price would appear to leave too 
much of the surplus with the relatively "powerless" buyer. Yet even if the 
seller's bargaining power drives the result to the outcome most favorable to 
the seller yet still within the contracting range of the buyer, the seller does 
not know whether the buyer's reservation point is $5.00 or $6.00. Recall the 
dynamic in bargaining, in which players actively compete to secure favor­
able terms while maintaining an orientation to the ultimate goal of 
coordination--of agreement.94 Within this dynamic, each party will ration­
ally seek to define a "commitment point"-a point beyond which it claims it 
will not concede further-at some remove from its reservation point. The 
greater the distance that its asserted commitment point stands from its true 
reservation point, the better.95 
Each party thus seeks to define a commitment point as close to its pre­
ferred end of the contracting spectrum as possible. But how do they do so? 
If the buyer's real reservation point is $6.00, how might she credibly draw a 
line at $5.00, or lower? Given a coordination dynamic, the seller is fully 
aware of the buyer's shared preference to reach agreement. As a result, the 
seller can be expected to push against the buyer's asserted unwillingness to 
pay more than $5.00, and to demand $6.00, then $7.00, and so on. When 
does this pattern come to an end? Naturally, one bound is the buyer's reser­
vation point-$6.00 in our example. But the buyer prefers to pay less. 
How-if at all--can she define a lower price from which she will not con­
cede further? 
90. See Johnston, supra note 32, at 617; Korobkin, supra note 61, at 1792-94, 1 817. Howard 
Raiffa effectively captures this dynamic in schematic terms. See RAIFFA, supra note 22, at 46. 
9 1 .  See Robert B. Ahdieh, Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of Law in the 
Creation of Strong Securities Markets, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 328-30 (2003). 
92. See infra note 1 77. 
93. See AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE COM­
PETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 300--01 (199 1); Russell Korobkin, 
Aspirations and Settlement, 88 CORNELL L. REv. I, 10--1 1  (2002). 
94. See supra Part I. 
95. See RAIFFA, supra note 22, at 44-65; see also Korobkin, supra note 61, at 1793, 1 808. 
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At heart, this is an exercise in defining expectations.96 In coordination 
games generally-with or without a dimension of bargaining-the operative 
goal is to coordinate player expectations. Success depends on each party 's 
ability to make accurate predictions of what the other party will expect of 
it.97 In the most basic, pure coordination game-in which interests are 
aligned-this is readily apparent. A husband separated from his wife in a 
department store, without the ability to communicate with her, must develop 
some expectation of where his spouse will expect him to go.98 Absent such 
expectations, his choice of location becomes random and error-prone. What, 
then, might be the source of such expectations-and resulting coordina­
tion-in contract bargaining? 
B. The Focal Point of Boilerplate 
In its coordination functions, boilerplate may play an important role in 
shaping expectations. Specifically, boilerplate may serve a "focal point" 
function in contract bargaining. Assessing the question of how to solve co­
ordination games, Thomas Schelling posited a role for "salience."99 In 
multiple equilibria games--circumstances in which more than one stable 
solution is possible-Schelling argued that solutions could not be found 
within the strictures of a mathematical model. '00 Instead, he offered the no­
tion of "focal points"-equilibrium solutions that distinguish themselves as 
unique in some way to parties pursuing coordination-as the key to resolu­
tion. In this conception, each party selects its strategy and resulting 
96. See Schelling, supra note 2 1 ,  at 20; see also SCHELLING, supra note I ,  at 70; Korobkin, 
supra note 6 1 ,  at 1 793, 1 802; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 1 8, at 973. Schelling writes: 
Each party's strategy is guided mainly by what he expects the other to accept or insist on; yet each 
knows that the other is guided by reciprocal thoughts. The final outcome must be a point from which 
neither expects the other to retreat; yet the main ingredient of this expectation is what one thinks the 
other expects the first to expect, and so on. Somehow, out of this fluid and indeterminate situation 
that seemingly provides no logical reason for anybody to expect anything except what he expects to 
be expected to expect, a decision is reached. These infinitely reflexive expectations must somehow 
converge on a single point, at which each expects the other not to expect to be expected to retreat. 
SCHELLING, supra note 1 ,  at 70. 
97. See Schelling, supra note 2 1 ,  at 19-20. 
98. See id. 
99. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive law, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1 649, 1 658 (2000); see also Judith Mehta, Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden, The Nature of Salience: 
An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 658, 661 ( 1994) 
(referring to "Schelling salience" as psychological theory of coordination). 
1 00. See Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive 
Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1 264 n.83 (2004). The 
attempt to select a point of agreement among multiple equilibria, Schelling posited, is less "rational" 
than intuitive-even artistic. See Schelling, supra note 2 1 ,  at 2 1 ,  22 ("Poets may do better than 
logicians at this game."); see also RAIFFA, supra note 22. It requires what might today be termed 
"fuzzy logic." Party A needs to determine what Party B will expect Party A to expect Party B to be 
willing to accept, and so on, for agreement at that point will offer Party A the greatest share of the 
contractual surplus. 
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coordination point-its meeting place in the department store-based on 
what point it expects the other party to find salient. wi 
Within this paradigm, if a particular point stands out, it will predictably 
emerge as the equilibrium solution absent communication. Each party will 
expect the other to select the prominent point as the likely solution and will 
therefore choose that point itself. The ultimate coordination point, thus, is 
simply the one that commands attention as the obvious place for agreement; 
the winner of the bargain, in turn, is the party whose preferred bargaining 
outcome sits closest to that point. wz Assuming a commitment to coordina­
tion, the other party cannot withhold its acquiescence and demand greater 
compromise, for the proposed solution offered by the focal point is the only 
solution that can effectively align the parties ' expectations. to) Focal points 
thus determine the outcome of a coordination game by shaping individual 
expectations of the likely behavior of other individuals.104 
Describing the role of focal points in facilitating coordination, Schelling 
began with cases of "tacit coordination"-interactions characterized by both 
an absence of communication ("tacit") and an alignment of player incentives 
("coordination"). When player interests are aligned, lack of communication 
is the sole obstacle to efficient resolution of the game. ws In such a dynamic, 
the role of focal points is readily apparent. For the husband and wife sepa­
rated in the department store, the focal point of the "lost and found" desk­
however irrational it might be-emerges as the appropriate meeting place.106 
By contrast with any other equally good or even preferable meeting place, it 
stands out and is consequently the best place for each spouse to go and 
therefore to meet. 
While the legal literature has looked to focal points primarily in such 
cases of tacit coordination, Schelling's most significant insights come as he 
turns from pure coordination to a bargaining dynamic more apposite to the 
present analysis. In "tacit bargaining," communication is still lacking, but 
I 0 I .  Schelling drew evidence of this pattern from a series of ad hoc empirical studies demon­
strating that two parties attempting to coordinate without communication could typically intuit a 
focal point based on common understandings and norms. See McAdams, supra note 99, at 1660-61 ;  
see also Smith, supra note 42, at 1 1 29 ("Salience i s  psychological prominence, and experimental 
studies show that people are good at coordinating by converging on prominent solutions."). 
102. See SCHELLING, supra note I, at 58-59. 
103. See id. 
1 04. See Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 100, at 1265 ("An equilibrium is focal if it has 
some feature that draws unique attention to itself, making it stand out among all equilibria . . . .  If for 
some psychological, historical, or cultural reason, the players are aware that one equilibrium draws 
special mental attention from all the players . . . .  [t]he resulting expectations are self-fulfilling: 
Once a player believes the other players are headed for a particular equilibrium, the player's best 
response is to engage in the strategy associated with that equilibrium."). 
105. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Steams, Beyond Counting Votes: The 
Political Economy of Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1 849, 1 898 n.230 (2001)  (discussing role of 
focal points and tacit coordination among U.S. Supreme Court justices during oral argument, when 
they seek to form coalitions but their ability to communicate is limited); McAdams, supra note 99, 
at 1658-59. 
I 06. See SCHELLING, supra note I, at 54. 
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player interests diverge. w7 Because coordination remains the goal, however, 
focal points can continue to play a role. Schelling captures as much with his 
tale of separated parachutists who must find each other, who have identical 
maps of the terrain on which they have landed, but who cannot communi­
cate. 108 In this dynamic, Schelling predicts that both will walk to the most 
prominent site demarcated on the map-on Schelling's map, a bridge-even 
if that location stands significantly farther from one than the other. The 
parachutists have distinct preferences for their meeting place based on how 
far they must travel. Yet both will travel to the bridge due to its focal power 
and consequent (perhaps exclusive) ability to facilitate coordination. 109 
Yet Schelling ultimately goes further, to suggest that focal points may be 
important in facilitating coordination even where communication is open.110 
In this conception, again going beyond most treatments of focal points 
among legal scholars, the key to the role of focal points is not the absence of 
communication; focal points are more than a substitute for communication 
in facilitating coordination. In "explicit bargaining," focal points may serve 
to redress the shortcomings of communication in the presence of conflict. 
Recall that when player interests favor coordination at some equilibrium but 
diverge as to the equilibrium preferred, communication may be an inade­
quate mechanism of coordination. Into this breach, various types of focal 
points-including boilerplate-may step in to play an essential role.111 
C. Boilerplate in Explicit B argaining 
Before turning to the true focal point function I would propose for boi­
lerplate in explicit bargaining, we might consider a related strategic pattern 
in contract bargaining. As with the strategic decision to throw one's steering 
wheel out the window in a game of "Chicken,"112 boilerplate may play a 
107. See Schelling, supra note 21,  at 22. 
1 08. See id. at 20, 22. 
109. See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 54--55. 
1 10. See Schelling, supra note 21, at 27; see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering 
Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 65 1 ( 1976) 
("Schelling suggests that two parties who are unable to communicate can concert their actions . . . .  
He then argues that comparable considerations apply even in cases where the parties can communi­
cate."). Thus, Schelling suggests that "[t]he 'coordination' of expectations [in explicit bargaining) is 
analogous to the 'coordination' of behavior when communication is cut off; and, in fact, they both 
involve nothing more nor less than intuitively perceived mutual expectations." See SCHELLING, 
supra note 1, at 68. 
1 1 1 .  See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 1 12 ("There is evidence that the influence of focal 
points is powerfully present even in explicit bargaining scenarios .  In bargains that involve numerical 
magnitudes, for example, there seems to be a strong magnetism in mathematical simplicity. More 
impressive, perhaps, is the frequency with which long negotiations over complicated quantitative 
formulas converge ultimately on something as crudely simple as equal shares or shares proportion­
ate to some common magnitude."). 
1 12 .  See HERMAN KAHN, ON EsCALATION 1 1  ( 1 965); Howard E. Abrams, Economic Analysis 
and Unconstitutional Conditions: A Reply to Professor Epstein, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 359, 363 
n.26 ( 1990); Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with 
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"credible commitment" function. 1 1 3  A bargaining party might thus shape its 
counterpart's expectation of concessions through a preexisting pattern of 
boilerplate usage. Specifically, if a party consistently uses the same boiler­
plate, neither accepting nor proposing deviations from it-even when there 
might be some apparent gains from such deviation-negotiating outcomes 
approximating that standard term are relatively more likely. The consistent 
use of a term may therefore offer some bargaining advantage.114 
The choice of debt contract terms is again instructive. While publicly is­
sued debt is not characterized by explicit bargaining, 115 the provisions in 
negotiated private loan agreements track public indentures in significant 
part. 116 A debtor's consistent use of a dual trigger event risk covenant would 
likely buttress its capacity to insist on that form in future loan agreements.1 1 7  
To similar effect is  the enumeration of  triggers for anti-dilution remedies. 
Longstanding provision for adjustments in the standard categories of 
events-stock splits, stock dividends, non-cash dividends, and warrants­
might allow a corporate issuer to resist pressure to provide adjustments for 
other corporate acts such as cash dividends or tender offers. 1 1 8 
Yet this calls attention to a critical caveat to this credible commitment 
conception of boilerplate in shaping expectations in bargaining. Specifi­
cally, the "boilerplate" at work is only so in a particular sense. The 
analysis herein is about contracting norms or standards within a particular 
industry or other context; I am interested in the value of adherence to such 
shared norms. The credible commitment function described above, how­
ever, arises with any contract term or form used consistently by the 
drafting party, without regard to its broader usage.119 A debtor whose loan 
agreements consistently offer adjustment only for stock splits, stock divi­
dends, and non-cash dividends-but not an equally standard adjustment 
Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 ,  1 09 n.43 1 (2000); Schelling, supra 
note 30, at 294. 
1 1 3. See Leonard J. Long, An Uneasy Case for a Tort of Negligent lnteiference with Credit 
Contract, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 235, 266 (2003). 
1 14. See SCHELLING, supra note 1 ,  at ch. 2; see also Gilo & Porat, supra note 12 at 1 0 1 6-18. 
Separately, Schelling has identified the potential for the credibility of a commitment to be enhanced 
by the linkage of consistent usage to some relevant principle. See Schelling, supra note 30, at 291 .  A 
commitment to equality of treatment might be understood in this light. See Ben-Shahar & White, 
supra note 2, at 968--09. 
1 15 .  One might imagine a construct in which underwriters represent a bargaining counterpart 
to corporate debt issuers. Even more attenuated would be a theory of rating agencies as engaged­
even if only very distantly-in bargaining with issuers. In neither case, however, do we have the 
kind of explicit bargaining characteristic of competing parties. As to rating agencies, the relevant 
pattern is actually closer to a pattern of tacit bargaining. 
1 1 6. The use of standardized terms in loan agreements is of particular relevance to the present 
analysis, moreover, given the lack of public trading of such debt and the resulting limits on network­
effect explanations of standardization. See supra notes 7-1 0  and accompanying text. 
1 17 .  See Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds, supra note 2,  at  960, 967. 
1 18. See Kahan, supra note 5, at 1 53. 
1 19. Cf Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1586. This suggests the interesting question of the focal 
impact of a shift from one's own standard term to some more universally invoked boilerplate term. 
In such a circumstance, one might imagine loss of the focal power of both points. 
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for warrants-possesses similar credibility in its ability to hold that 
ground as the debtor whose consistent usage tracks the wider norm. This 
initial, credible commitment function of boilerplate in shaping bargaining 
expectations, then, turns not on the use of a standard form, but on the con­
sistent use of any form. 
As the foregoing analysis of credible commitments in contract negotia­
tions suggests, aspects of the role of boilerplate in shaping expectations 
echo the signaling functions described above.120 Like signaling of the exis­
tence (or absence) of private information or of information regarding group 
identity, the consistent use of particular terms conveys information regarding 
a relevant characteristic of a bargaining party. Thus, consistent use of stan­
dard, dual trigger covenants might be said to signal both a median level of 
risk and a relative inflexibility in bargaining. The implications of the infor­
mation offered by boilerplate in its signaling and coordination functions, 
however, are distinct. The former speak to the merits of the parties' transac­
tion, while the latter concern the nature of their bargaining. 
It is important not to overdo this distinction. Often the same information 
will be in play in both signaling and coordination. Further, that information 
may be conveyed by the very same speech or conduct. In this sense, one 
could well bring both signaling and coordination under one common head­
ing. I separate them, however, given the distinct ends to which the same 
information, conveyed in the same way, is being put. The information atten­
dant to the coordination functions of boilerplate speaks to a party's 
expectations regarding the bargaining outcomes acceptable to its counter­
part. In a sense, boilerplate's coordination functions go to process; they are 
about the bargaining itself. By contrast, boilerplate's signals do not speak to 
the expectations of a party in bargaining but to a party's character or private 
information or to the nature of the proposed transaction. These are relevant 
to the parties' bargaining, of course, but are more especially about the sub­
stance of that bargain. They do not directly speak to what the other side can 
expect in the negotiation process. 
As noted above, a corporate debtor's proposed inclusion of a standard, 
dual trigger event risk covenant might offer certain affirmative signals. 
Among others, these would include evidence of the relatively conventional 
risk profile of the debtor, the absence of private information regarding the 
enterprise's vulnerability to takeover, and the plain vanilla character of the 
transaction. The same debtor's consistent---even invariable-use of dual 
trigger event risk covenants, however, might also influence a potential 
lender's expectations of the likelihood of securing a concession to use a pure 
rating decline covenant instead.121 While there is some link between the sig­
naling and coordination functions of boilerplate, then, the crucial feature of 
1 20. See supra Part II.A. 
1 2 1 .  The use of a standardized anti-dilution formula to reduce conversion price-the standard 
remedy-rather than a simple notice requirement or an outright prohibition might also be seen to 
capture this distinction. While such standard usage offers signals regarding the issuer's fiscal stabil­
ity, and likely financial needs, it also-if consistent-is likely to shape an investor's expectations in 
attempting to negotiate the terms of a new loan agreement. 
1058 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104: 1 033 
the latter-and what makes it a distinct and particularly interesting element 
in our understanding of the use of boilerplate by sophisticated parties-is its 
orientation to player expectations.122 
Putting aside the credible commitment function of consistent use of a 
given contract term, and acknowledging the distinction between the signal­
ing and coordination functions of boilerplate, what of the true, focal point 
function of boilerplate in explicit bargaining? To appreciate this dynamic, 
we might begin by considering cases in which it might arise. Recall once 
again the choice of form in the design of event risk covenants.123 At one 
bound, a potential debtor might prefer to exclude any such provision. At the 
other, the debtor might be amenable to go so far as to include a dual trigger 
covenant with a limited set of triggering events and a put-at-par remedy at 
95%. The potential lender, meanwhile, might prefer a pure rating decline 
covenant, but be prepared to fall back as far as a dual trigger covenant with 
the standard list of triggering events.124 Within the resulting bargaining zone 
between the parties' reservation points (that is, various forms of a dual trig­
ger covenant), no particular solution stands out. 
The same might be true in the design of anti-dilution protections for a 
sale of assets when both debtor and lender agree on the inclusion of some 
protection but diverge in their views of the appropriate mechanism and 
form.125 In the face of a sale of all or substantially all assets of the debtor, 
standard anti-dilution terms provide for convertibility to the new form of 
equity offered to existing shareholders.126 Further, they provide for release of 
the seller from its obligations and include a put provision for fundamental 
changes in control.127 But the American Bar Foundation's Commentaries 
also identify potential alternatives, including merely requiring notice to 
holders of convertible securities, imposing an outright prohibition on certain 
corporate acts, or defining the potential triggering events, as well as reme­
dies, in a range of ways. 128 One might imagine a debtor who prefers mere 
notice but is determined to go no further in offering anti-dilution protection 
than to offer the lower of a downward conversion or market price adjust­
mene29 or, in the alternative, the standard terms above. The potential lender, 
meanwhile, might be expected to favor prohibition but be amenable to the 
standard terms or to a market price adjustment triggered by a relatively 
comprehensive litany of triggers. Again, we find a gradation of potential 
deals that .the parties might strike. 
1 22. On the distinct emphasis of signaling, see Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 100. 
1 23. See Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds, supra note 2, at 960, 967. 
1 24. See id. at 967. 
1 25. See Bratton, supra note 2, at 684, 688 n.79; Kahan, supra note 5, at 159--60; see also 
COMMENTARIES, supra note 49, at 527-28. 
1 26. See Kahan, supra note 5, at 159--60. 
1 27. See id. at 160--61 .  
1 28. See COMMENTARIES, supra note 49, at 527-29. 
1 29. See Kaplan, supra note 49, at 29 (noting distinct theories behind market price and con­
version price formulas for anti-dilution clauses). 
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Most tangibly, we might recall the manifestation of this pattern with 
price, as outlined above.130 Our buyer is prepared to pay up to $6.00, while 
the seller wants at least $4.00. In such a situation, both parties would settle 
for a price between $4.00 and $6.00. Outside that range, either buyer or 
seller will demur. At all points except the bounds of the range, however, 
each party is also prepared to accept a higher or lower price. Hence, our 
difficulty. 
In each of these cases, we have a multiple equilibrium game with no fa­
cially apparent solution.131 Both parties stand ready to contract at some range 
of points within a spectrum. At all points beside the very bounds of that bar­
gaining zone, however, both parties are also prepared to agree to less 
favorable terms.132 It is here that we find the need to coordinate expecta­
tions.133 Each party must develop an expectation of how far its counterpart 
is willing to concede, yet still contract. 134 Where is the other party 's line in 
the sand?135 
As suggested at the outset, communication cannot offer an adequate 
solution to this dilemma.136 Because players are engaged in bargaining­
because they seek to coordinate but have divergent interests as to their pre­
ferred coordination point-communication is unlikely to include either 
party's true reservation point.137 Communication reduces to cheap talk.138 
Each party will insist that its asserted commitment point constitutes its res­
ervation point. The debtor will assert its opposition to any event risk 
1 30. See supra notes 90--95 and accompanying text. 
1 3 1 .  This multiple equilibrium pattern might also arise in bargaining over other features of a 
debt contract's anti-dilution provisions, including the potential prohibition of certain events, a re­
quirement of notice, and the provision of one form of adjustment or another. See Bratton, supra note 
2, at 684, 688 n.79; see also COMMENTARIES, supra note 49, at 527-28. In a completely distinct 
contracting context, a multiple equilibrium dynamic might be found in the varied potential treat­
ments of the right of assignment. From a prohibition on assignment, to its authorization with written 
consent, its plenary authorization with continued liability, or its authorization generally, negotiating 
parties face multiple potential bargaining outcomes. 
1 32. See Schelling, supra note 21, at 29. 
1 33. See Ahdieh, supra note 3, at 732-33 (discussing difficulties in developing accurate ex­
pectations among heterogeneous parties); Goodpaster, supra note 17 ,  at 344; Schelling, supra note 
2 1 ,  at 20; cf David B. Simpson, The Drafting of Loan Agreements: A Borrower 's Viewpoint, 28 
Bus. LAW. 1 16 1 ,  1 163 ( 1973) (suggesting coordinative power of boilerplate). 
1 34. See Goodpaster, supra note 1 7, at 342-43, 344 ("Once the bargaining parties have as­
sured their bottom lines or reservation values and have staked out their respective positions on the 
bargaining range, nothing inherently seems to impel settlement at any particular point between the 
positions, except each party's expectations regarding what the other side in fact will accept."). 
1 35. In enumerating the relevant unknowns, one might most broadly think of a counterparty's 
value system. More specifically, a bargaining party is unsure of the other party's commitment to 
certain outcomes, its willingness to take certain risks to secure preferred outcomes, and its desire 
(and ability) to absorb certain costs to do so. Even absent conflicting interests, it should be relatively 
apparent, such information is likely to be difficult to communicate. Once we introduce the conflict 
of bargaining, this is even more obvious. 
1 36. See supra Part I. 
1 37. See id. 
1 38. See Ahdieh, supra note 1 4, at 239. 
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covenant, while the lender will insist that only a pure rating decline cove­
nant will do. Further, our debtor will offer mere notice of a potential 
dilution, at very best, while the lender will draw the line at an absolute bar. 
Our buyer, finally, will insist that it can afford no more than a dollar or two, 
while her counterpart seller will not part with her "mug" for less than 
$9.00. 139 In each case, a party 's insistence on a particular deal point is read­
ily countered by insistence on an alternative deal point and strongly 
worded-almost boilerplate-assurances that no further concessions will be 
made. 
Within this dynamic, what is the strategic project of each party ? Along a 
spectrum of potential points of agreement, how does one party maximize its 
share of the contractual surplus? As noted, each hopes to establish a com­
mitment point as distant as possible from its true reservation point as the 
coordination point from which it will not concede further. Yet this is a task 
worthy of Sisyphus if any given point of agreement looks no different than 
any other potential point, including those immediately to either side of it on 
the parties' spectrum of equilibrium solutions. 140 
If some location-some focal point-along the spectrum of shared solu­
tions stood out or could be made to stand out, however, that point would 
likely be important in defining the parties' expectations of what further con­
cessions might be made. 1 41 In essence, if some particular point stands out 
from others, a party's insistence on that specific equilibrium solution neces-
1 39. Cf Korobkin, supra note 39, at 627-28 (describing experimental analysis of the endow­
ment effect). 
140. See Schelling, supra note 2 1 ,  at 2 1 -22; see also Schelling, supra note 30, at 28 1-82 
("There is some range of alternative outcomes in which any point is better for both sides than no 
agreement at all. To insist on any such point is pure bargaining, since one always would take less 
rather than reach no agreement at all, and since one always can recede if retreat proves necessary to 
agreement. Yet if both parties are aware of the limits to this range, any outcome is a point from 
which at least one party would have been willing to retreat and the other knows it! There is no rest­
ing place."). 
As suggested above, boilerplate's signaling functions are likely to be at their acme when rele­
vant contracting choices have a relatively binary quality to them. By contrast, the coordination 
functions of boilerplate-particularly in explicit bargaining-are likely to be most significant when 
the parties face a range of potential equilibrium solutions. Most obviously, this is true because in a 
binary contracting universe, both points are focal. One solution is focal because it is boilerplate; the 
other is focal because it is not. 
1 4 1 .  See Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 100, at 1 266 ("Experiments confirm that, in 
games of multiple equilibria, salient non-payoff features (focal points) significantly facilitate coor­
dination."); cf Christopher A. Whytock, Thinking Beyond the Domestic-International Divide: 
Toward a Unified Concept of Public Law, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1 55, 175-76 (2004) (referring to 
"multiple paths toward capturing the gains from cooperation and no obvious way . . .  to converge on 
one of them" (quoting Geoffrey Garrett & Barry Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Con­
structing the European Community 's Internal Market, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY 173, 1 75 
(Judith Goldstein & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 1 993))). Korobkin's treatment of the status quo bias 
can be understood in this spirit, as a theory of the role of the status quo--including boilerplate-in 
coordination. See Korobkin, supra note 39, at 612;  see also David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth 
Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform: Employment At Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 975, 1 0 1 0--17  ( 1998). 
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sarily enjoys greater credibility as  a non-negotiable position. One can appre­
ciate this with reference to boilerplate. 1 42 
Faced with a range of potential deal points over a given contract term, 
within a largely undifferentiated bargaining zone, one party might be able to 
define a credibly firm commitment point by proposing the use of a standard 
boilerplate term.1 43 In essence, a party may be able to instill greater expecta­
tion of its unwillingness to deviate from a given term-to concede further­
when it proposes a boilerplate term. The proposed use of boilerplate may 
thus have the effect of differentiating the relevant proposal from the pro­
posed adoption of any other potential deal point within the parties' 
bargaining zone. Extending Schelling's focal point analysis to the use of 
boilerplate, the latter may represent a "kind of default" in negotiation. 144 
142. Distinct from its coordination functions, the proposed use of boilerplate language may 
help to define the parameters for bargaining over a given term given the cognitive limitations of 
bargaining parties. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 30, at 362-63; Korobkin, supra note 10, at 
1 608. A drafting party's proposed terms may thus define a point around which subsequent negotia­
tions will be conducted, for the simple reason that everything in a contract cannot be negotiated 
from scratch. Cf Hill & King, supra note 43 (suggesting potential for form language to be used as 
mechanism to insert favorable language into contract). This may be especially true in the complex 
negotiations of interest herein. In such negotiations, some narrowing in the scope of bargaining over 
any particular term may be essential, given the total number of terms under negotiation. Cf Nellie 
Eunsoo Choi, Contracts with Open or Missing Terms Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the 
Common Law: A Proposal for Unification, 103 CoLUM. L. REv. 50, 65 (2003) ("Wasting time by 
bickering over detailed language in a forty-page agreement that primarily addresses scenarios that 
may never occur . . .  is especially annoying to an action-oriented businessman."). Yet there is noth­
ing specific to boilerplate that causes it to serve this narrowing function. Any proposed term may 
have the effect of constraining the universe of potentially negotiated outcomes. But see infra notes 
1 60-167 and accompanying text. 
143. Goodpaster analogously refers to the offering of reasons, rationales, or justifications for a 
particular proposal. These, he suggests, make a position "more credible and, therefore, harder for 
the other party to assail or counter without providing equal or more persuasive reasons for his or her 
position." Goodpaster, supra note 1 7, at 345-46; see also note 1 14. It also bears noting, however, 
that credible insistence on the nature of some point as boilerplate may be effective in shaping expec­
tations, even if it is not actually boilerplate. 
1 44. See SCHELLING, supra note I .  Besides helping to influence the particular equilibrium 
ultimately emerging from bargaining parties' negotiations over any particular term, boilerplate may 
also be used to define which issues are subject to, and which issues are excluded from, negotiation. 
See Eggleston et al., supra note 1 7, at 1 1 3. By using standardized terms in certain parts of a contract 
but not others, a drafting party may be able to effectively de-emphasize the former. Selective use of 
boilerplate in a draft contract alongside tailored or even completely open-ended terms may thus 
define the bounds of the overall negotiation between the parties. In colloquial terms, it may help to 
define what is on the table. Cf Kahan & Klausner, supra note 30, at 362-63 (suggesting utility of 
initial control of terms given anchoring biases); Korobkin, supra note 1 0, at 1608; Simpson, supra 
note 1 33, at 1 162. 
One can visualize this possibility with an eye to standard-form consumer contracts. A form 
leaving price, quantity, and the warranty term open can be expected to invite negotiation as to each 
of these terms. By contrast, a form with blanks only for price and quantity is at least relatively less 
likely to prompt negotiation over the warranty. Instead, the boilerplate standard will be left to define 
that term. Compare Austerlitz German Shepherd Dogs Puppy Guarantee and Contract, 
http://www.austerlitzshepherds.com/austerlitzlcontract.html (form agreement for purchase of dogs, 
with only two blank terms) (last visited Nov. 15,  2005) with Janet Joers, Sample Puppy Contract, 
http://www.chowchowcentral.com/cccpupcontract.htm (last visited Nov. 15 ,  2005) (contract with 
additional blanks). Even if this were not always true-and one would not expect it to be so--it 
suggests some strategic benefit to the selective use of boilerplate in seeking to influence the scope of 
any given contract negotiation. 
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The use of boilerplate for strategic advantage is readily apparent within 
this conception. In essence, the proposed use of boilerplate creates a basis 
for a party to insist on its position; it allows that party to hold its ground.145 
Unlike other bargaining positions, as to which the marginal demand for con­
cessions might be expected to bear fruit, boilerplate may serve as a focal 
point from which a counterparty ultimately seeking agreement may be less 
likely to expect further movement. 146 
Naturally, such an approach assumes the boilerplate term to be relatively 
favorable to the relevant party. Given such circumstances, however, the boi­
lerplate may-as a strategic matter-represent the best offer and best 
outcome likely to be secured. If, by contrast, the boilerplate is unfavorable 
to a party--or, more specifically, is worse than the deal they can expect to 
otherwise secure-boilerplate ceases to be of coordinative utility. The boi­
lerplate need not constitute a party's optimal preference; it simply needs to 
be sufficiently attractive (among the universe of possibilities) that its effi­
cacy as a bargaining position renders it optimal. Considering our event risk 
covenant example, a debtor's proposed adoption of a standard-form dual 
trigger covenant constitutes a more difficult bargaining position to displace, 
even if less favorable to the debtor than a hostile control change covenant. In 
essence, boilerplate allows the debtor to avoid even worse outcomes. 
Boilerplate may thus offer an "indirect means" for advancing one's ne­
gotiating position. More concretely, the proposed use of boilerplate may 
allow a party "to convince the other side that [its] maximum expectation is 
really [its] minimum breaking-off point."1 47 
This coordination function of boilerplate may be especially important 
when tied to a party's concession on a given term.1 48 Behind every negoti­
ated concession is the (rational) fear that it opens the door to a cascade of 
further demands for concessions: "If you're willing to give that much, why 
not this much more?" In this situation, the proposed use of boilerplate may 
be especially useful. It may help to shape expectations that the given con-
1 45. See SCHELLING, supra note I, at 70; cf Goodpaster, supra note 1 7, at 342-43 ("[T]he 
competitive negotiator wants to persuade the other side about the firmness of [its] own assened 
bottom line."). Of course, the assertion of the boilerplate or otherwise standard term as one's reser­
vation point is itself cheap talk, at some level. It simply appears less cheap than any other potential 
negotiating position. 
1 46. See SCHELLING, supra note I, at 70-7 1 ("Most bargaining situations ultimately involve 
some range of possible outcomes within which each party would rather make a concession than fail 
to reach agreement at all. In such a situation, any potential outcome is one from which at least one 
of the parties, and probably both, would have been willing to retreat for the sake of agreement, and 
very often the other party knows it. Any potential outcome is therefore one that either party could 
have improved by insisting; yet he may have no basis for insisting, since the other knows or suspects 
that he would rather concede than do without agreement. Each party's strategy is guided mainly by 
what he expects the other to accept or insist on; yet each knows that the other is guided by reciprocal 
thoughts. The final outcome must be a point from which neither expects the other to retreat."). 
1 47. See EDWARD PETERS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN LABOR NEGOTIATIONS 1 1 2 ( 1955). 
1 48. See Schelling, supra note 2 1 ,  at 30. 
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cession is not susceptible to further backsliding.1 49 As a defensive tool, then, 
boilerplate may serve to cabin negotiated concessions.150 
By way of example, when debtor and lender are negotiating the enumer­
ated triggers in a dual trigger covenant, the debtor can be expected to favor a 
short list and the lender a long one. In ultimately giving way-perhaps in 
exchange for some other concession-a debtor does well to fall back on the 
standard list of triggering events.1 51 A ready answer is then available to the 
proposed addition of a major asset acquisition trigger, which is not ordinar­
ily included. If the proposed concession includes a non-standard provision 
for relief from an asset acquisition by the debtor, by contrast, the lender's 
subsequent proposal of yet further non-standard triggers becomes signifi-
1 d.ffi l . 152 cant y more i icu t to resist. 
Yet boilerplate may also be important offensively.153 When the seemingly 
ascendant party to a negotiation proposes the use of boilerplate, it acts to 
create an expectation that further concessions will not be demanded if its 
proposed terms are accepted. 
149. In this vein, Ben-Shahar and White observe a dramatic deviation between auto manufac­
turers' contracts with information technology suppliers and the standard contract the manufacturers 
use with all other suppliers. Notably, the former are more generous not only on intellectual property 
issues but also more generally. See Ben-Shahar & White, supra note 2, at 97S-79. This can readily 
be understood within the coordination dynamic I describe. Once the manufacturers deviate from the 
"hard and fast" form on intellectual property questions, holding their ground becomes more difficult 
as a general matter. 
I SO .  "The same point is illustrated when one tries to give up cigarettes or liquor. 'Just one 
little drink,' is a notoriously unstable compromise offer; and more people give up cigarettes alto­
gether than manage to reach a stable compromise at a small daily quota. Once the virgin principle is 
gone, there is no confidence in any resting point, and the expectation is relapse. The very recogni­
tion of this keeps attention focused on the point of complete abstinence." SCHELLING, supra note I ,  
at 1 12. 
1 5 1 .  If a debtor is agreeing to triggers, thus, it ought to agree to the boilerplate enumeration of 
( 1 )  the acquisition of a specified percentage of the debtor's stock, (2) replacement of a majority of 
the board of directors by a proxy challenge, (3) sale of substantially all the debtor's assets, (4) a 
merger or consolidation, or (5) the payment of dividends or repurchase of shares over a specified 
percentage within a defined period. See Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds, supra 
note 2, at 955. 
1 52. See id. at 961 .  The same might be said of the enumeration of events triggering anti­
dilution measures. By falling back on a list providing relief in the face of stock splits, stock divi­
dends, and non-cash dividends, but not the equally standard case of warrants, a lender faces the 
heightened prospect of arriving at an even shorter list. See Kahan, supra note S, at 1 53. 
I 53. Schelling captures this potential in his identification of rivers as focal points in military 
conflict. See Schelling, supra note 2 1 ,  at 26; see also SCHELLING, supra note 1 ,  at 71 ("If some 
troops have retreated to the river in our map, they will expect to be expected to make a stand. This is 
the one spot to which they can retreat without necessarily being expected to retreat further, while, if 
they yield any further, there is no place left where they can be expected to make a determined stand. 
Similarly, the advancing party can expect to force the other to retreat to the river without having his 
advance interpreted as an insatiable demand for unlimited retreat. There is stability at the river-and 
perhaps nowhere else."). 
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D. Boilerplate in Tacit Bargaining 
A more stylized version of the foregoing pattern may also play out in 
contracting circumstances akin to Schelling's "tacit bargaining."1 54 In these 
circumstances, communication is absent, and there is consequently no nego­
tiation in the ordinary sense. On the other hand, divergent interests mean 
that bargaining persists. Recall Schelling's example, in which separated 
parachutists need to locate one another but stand at different distances from 
various points on their common map. Because the distance between each 
point and each parachutist is likely to be shorter for one parachutist and 
longer for the other, their preferred meeting places will necessarily diverge. 
Yet because they must meet, each will travel the greater or lesser distance 1 55 necessary for them to do so. 
A tacit bargaining of sorts might be said to arise in take-it-or-leave-it 
contracting dynamics. Most obviously, this would include standard-form 
consumer contracts in which no mechanism of communication is available. 
Even if communication could occur, moreover, the non-negotiable terms of 
the proposed contract put the offeree in essentially the same position. But 
similar patterns of tacit bargaining can also be found beyond adhesion con­
tracts. Among sophisticated parties, for example, the case of publicly issued 
debt is suggestive. With such debt, the relevant bond indenture is drafted by 
the issuer, who then presents its terms-as part and parcel of the issuance­
to potential creditors. The latter then choose to accept the terms (that is, pur­
chase the bond) or reject to them. Communication is unavailable and 
1 1� counterproposa s cannot be offered. 
In analyzing coordination dynamics, Schelling posited that a party 
whose interests lay closer to the likely focal point for decision might favor 
non-communication.157 In the absence of communication, such a party can 
predictably assume the available focal point will emerge as the equilibrium 
solution. Given as much, the closer party might even attempt to interrupt 
communication.158 By doing so, the party secures a relatively preferred solu­
tion. As only a focal solution can effectively coordinate the players' 
expectations absent communication, non-communication might be better for 
the closer party. 
One might conceive of the public issuance of debt and analogous exam­
ples of seriatim bargaining of a sort as having a similar quality. In this 
dynamic, the issuer or other drafting party can exercise discretion to define 
1 54. See Schelling, supra note 2 1 ,  at 22. 
155.  See id. at  22-23. 
1 56. Auto manufacturers' standard-form contracts with their suppliers, which are not subject 
to bargaining, are another example. See Ben-Shahar & White, supra note 2. 
1 57. See Schelling, supra note 2 1 ,  at 23. 
1 58. See SCHELLING, supra note 1, at 1 46 ("When the outcome depends on coordination, the 
timely destruction of communication may be a winning tactic. When a man and his wife are arguing 
by telephone over where to meet for dinner, the argument is won by the wife if she simply an­
nounces where she is going and hangs up. And the status quo is often preserved by a person who 
evades discussion of alternatives, even to the extent of simply turning off his hearing aid."). 
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its terms, naturally favoring those it prefers. As no rejoinder can be offered, 
the resulting terms are necessarily focal. If any solution is to be reached, it 
must be on the drafter 's terms. Of course, creditors may elect to "leave it," 
rather than "take it." If they decide to take it, however, they take it as is. 
Yet this proves too much. Any term elected by the drafter-and not boi­
lerplate alone-would have such a focal effect. 159 With non-boilerplate 
terms, however, the propensity to "leave it" may be significantly greater. 
Boilerplate terms might therefore have significantly greater focal power. 160 
Non-drafting parties faced with non-negotiable boilerplate terms may be 
more prone to accept such terms as fair, reasonable, or otherwise legiti­
mate. 161 As recently explored by Bob Scott, experimental analysis of 
Ultimatum Game patterns of play supports this possibility. 162 In this dy­
namic, one player proposes an allocation of a certain monetary sum, which 
the other player can either accept or reject, the latter resulting in no payoff 
to either party. The receiving party should rationally accept any offer that is 
put forward. In reality, however, players consistently reject offers below a 
certain proportion. Thus, there would appear to be some assessment of fair­
ness in the receiving party 's evaluation of offers, which impacts its ultimate 
willingness to accept proposed terms.163 
One might predict such a dynamic in the use of boilerplate terms in 
bond indentures and other contracts not subject to negotiation.164 The use of 
standard dual trigger event risk covenants in a bond indenture, as opposed to 
manager-friendly hostile control change covenants or creditor-friendly pure 
rating decline covenants, 165 offers a potential example. Given the nature of 
public issuance and the resulting lack of communication, the choice among 
1 59. See Korobkin, supra note 10, at 1 586. 
1 60. See Korobkin, supra note 6 1 ,  at 1 8 1 9  ("Given that a wide bargaining zone provides for a 
range of possible deal points and that fairness in surplus allocation is a dominant norm, adherence to 
the fairness norm could theoretically substitute for bargaining . . . "); see also id. at 1825-29. 
1 6 1 .  See id. a t  1 8 1 7-19; see also note 1 14. 
1 62. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 1 64 1  (2003). To related effect, Eggleston, Posner, and Zeckhauser have identified the tendency 
of what they term "faim-::ss conventions" to favor contract simplicity. See Eggleston et al., supra 
note 17,  at 1 1 4-15.  "[If the parties] have a sense of what is a fair division of the surplus, this sense 
of fairness may provide a focal point around which they bargain, enabling them to reach agreement 
quickly." Id. 
1 63. See Ben-Shahar & White, supra note 2, at 968-69. Analogously, Claire Hill has sug­
gested that attorneys' deviations from familiar forms may induce strong resistance from 
counterparties. See Hill, supra note 2, at 69, 68 n. 19.  
164.  Boilerplate, along with other standard terms, may thus address the need identified by 
Korobkin to reach consensus on the measurement of fair results. See Korobkin, supra note 61,  at 
1 820, 1 827-28. 
165. See Kahan & Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds, supra note 2, at 952, 955. 
Other potential occasions for this pattern of boilerplate usage might also be identified, including use 
of the older conversion price standard rather than the newer market price standard in anti-dilution 
provisions. See Bratton, supra note 2, at 687 n.76. More closely approximating the Ultimatum 
Game pattern, a sovereign debt issuer might utilize the standard 66.7% requirement for alterations to 
the pari passu clause, rather than a more favorable 50% standard, on the premise that the standard 
figure might be seen as fairer, notwithstanding the lack of negotiation. 
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potential event risk covenants is the issuer's alone. Yet a bargaining dynamic 
remains because of the demands of the marketplace. In the face of this dy­
namic, use of the standard provision may be important. Potential creditors, 
deprived of the opportunity to negotiate, might plausibly be expected-in 
line with the observed expectation of fairness among contracting parties-to 
find a standard dual trigger covenant . significantly more palatable a focal 
point for agreement. 
When a proposed contract term is standard, then, a non-drafting party 
may consider the absence of negotiation less problematic. This may even be 
true in the presence of significant bargaining power. Potential creditors of a 
relatively high-risk corporate debtor may be amenable to boilerplate terms 
in a public issuance even when they could have readily secured more favor­
able terms-a pure rating decline covenant, for example-in a private loan 
agreement. Such boilerplate terms might be considered fair even if less ad­
vantageous than potential alternatives. 166 Parties with more limited 
bargaining power, then, might well be expected to prefer a pattern of tacit 
bargaining, in the face of relatively favorable boilerplate. This approach may 
allow them to achieve otherwise unattainable bargaining outcomes. Through 
the strategic use of boilerplate, they may literally achieve more than they 
could have bargained for.167 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF STRATEGIC BOILERPLATE 
In both its signaling and coordination functions, boilerplate may serve 
an important strategic role in bargaining. In the right hands and the right 
circumstances, boilerplate constitutes a weapon of choice in contract nego­
tiation. At least in part, this may help to explain-and to encourage-the use 
of boilerplate by sophisticated parties. Further, it has potential implications 
for the evolution of boilerplate and the nature of contract bargaining, among 
other things. To conclude, some of the more notable implications of strate­
gic boilerplate are suggested below. 
A. Boilerplate and Change 
As discussed in the legal literature, boilerplate would seem to possess a 
somewhat static and passive quality.168 It simply is. Within a strategic con­
ception, by contrast, boilerplate is created, shaped, and used. If boilerplate 
has signaling and coordination effects, significant bargaining advantage may 
1 66. This dynamic is likely to be familiar to any lawyer who has sat down for a closing on a 
new home. While numerous terms contained in the note may appear onerous or overreaching, these 
are nonetheless likely to be deemed acceptable if they are standard terms. Some presumption of 
fairness, in essence, is ascribed to such terms. By contrast, tailored terms are likely to be subject to 
much sharper scrutiny. See Korobkin, supra note IO, at 1 605-09 (observing resistance to alteration 
of terms in form agreements, even to conform with relevant default rule). 
1 67. Cf Korobkin, supra note 85, at 1 205--06. 
1 68. See, e.g., John E. Murray, The Definitive "Battle of the Forms ": Chaos Revisited, 20 J.L. 
& CoM. I ,  1 1  (2000). 
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follow from its substantive placement. Self-interested parties would there­
fore do well to define or redefine contracting norms to fall at Kaldor-Hicks 
optimal points within potential contracting spectra. 169 
While relevant to contracting parties generally, the opportunity to exer­
cise such influence is likely to be especially available to sophisticated 
parties. As repeat players, sophisticated parties have both increased oppor­
tunity to progressively shift the prevailing norm to a preferred point and 
strong incentives to do so. By allocating resources to introducing, shifting, 
and refining boilerplate, they may secure a heightened share of the contrac­
tual surplus across multiple contracts. 
Sophisticated parties might be expected to encourage such shifts in a va­
riety of ways. Most obvious is their consistent use of particular terms. 
Across a succession of contracts, repeat players may significantly influence 
an industry norm. This impact might be built upon by the use of preferred 
boilerplate in progressively expanding categories of contracts. In this way, 
repeat players may encourage the migration of preferred contracting norms 
across distinct contracting subjects. 170 
Most systematically, sophisticated parties might use various forms of 
organized drafting to encourage shifts in boilerplate to favor their interests. 
Model covenant and similar model term drafting committees--often of one 
or another bar association-may be the most common venue for such group 
exercises in contract design. 171 Industry specific form agreements or model 
terms, often a product of industry associations, are another.172 In either fo­
rum, even dominant contracting parties may do well to invest in efforts to 
influence the contracting norms that emerge. 
The possibility of boilerplate evolution through organized drafting helps 
to highlight a final point of interest. While the emphasis herein is on the 
strategic use-and hence design--of boilerplate by bargaining parties, third 
parties may also have an important role in the strategic dynamic of bargain­
ing outlined above. This is most readily apparent with reference to the 
coordination functions of boilerplate, in which the focal effect of the pre­
vailing norm is independent of the source of that norm. Thus, a third party's 
influence on the norm can play an important role in bargaining outcomes. 
To this effect, Schelling spoke of the power of mediators to influence out­
comes notwithstanding their lack of formal authority to dictate any 
decision. 173 In the case of boilerplate, one might conceive broadly represen­
tative bar associations as operating-at least on occasion-in this fashion. 
169. See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 15 ,  at 23-24. 
170. Cf Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves " Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'v REv. 95 ( 1974). 
1 7 1 .  See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 15 ,  at 23-24; Kahan & Klausner, Standardization 
and Innovation, supra note 2, at 761--64. The American Bar Association's Commentaries, supra 
note 49, are a prime example of this pattern. See Klausner, supra note 7, at 8 16--18. 
172. See Kevin E. Davis, The Role of Nonprofits in the Production of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. 
L. REv. 1075, 1078-81 (2006). 
173.  See Schelling, supra note 2 1 ,  at 26, 28; see also Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 100. 
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Yet relevant third parties might also include individuals or institutions with 
incentives to favor particular outcomes, even if not parties to relevant trans­
actions.1 74 Consumer groups might be one example. One might even 
conceive the American Bar Foundation's preparation of the arguably lender­
friendly provisions of the Commentaries in this light.175 
A strategic theory of boilerplate suggests a more dynamic pattern of boi­
lerplate development. Boilerplate can be expected to change over time. Such 
change is not necessarily a product of passive evolution, moreover, but may 
also be driven by affirmative investment of the time and resources necessary 
to effectuate it. If boilerplate serves significant signaling and coordination 
functions, sophisticated players likely to engage in recurrent contracting do 
well to seek influence in shaping prevailing contracting norms.1 76 
B. Rethinking Bargaining Skill 
Following directly from the analysis in Section A is a potential need to 
rethink the nature of bargaining power. In essence, both the signaling and 
coordination functions of boilerplate suggest that bargaining skill (and bar­
gaining power) in negotiations may not be exclusively about a party's ability 
or capacity within the negotiation, as we conventionally think of it.177 Rather, 
a significant aspect of bargaining skill and power may be the capacity to lay 
the groundwork for negotiation. At least some part of a party's bargaining 
power may tum on the pre-negotiation definition of relevant boilerplate­
including in the ways outlined above. In Schelling's terms, an essential skill 
(and fruitful task) may therefore be "to set the stage in such a way as to give 
1 74. See Davis, supra note 172, at 1088. 
1 75. See Simpson, supra note 1 33, at 1 1 63; see also id. at 1 1 66 (offering example). While 
Simpson suggests negotiating against the lender-friendly terms contained in the Commentaries, this 
is rendered more difficult by the very fact of those terms' inclusion in the Commentaries. See id. at 
1 1 67.  
176. As the implications of a strategic theory of boilerplate for boilerplate evolution suggest, 
such a theory speaks broadly to the important trends toward standardization in the world today. 
Across an array of technological, financial, and other sectors of the world economy, greater attention 
to the strategic dynamic of standardization is in order. 
1 77. See Russell Korobkin, Bargaining Power as Threat of Impasse, 87 MARQ. L. REv. 867, 
867 (2004) ("[R]elative bargaining power stems entirely from the negotiator's ability to, explicitly 
or implicitly, make a single threat credibly: 'I will walk away from the negotiating table without 
agreeing to a deal if you do not give me what I demand. ' The source of the ability to make such a 
threat, and therefore the source of bargaining power, is the ability to project that he has a desirable 
alternative to reaching an agreement, often referred to as a 'BATNA.' "); cf Bratton, supra note 2, at 
688 (referring to traditional bargaining power rationale for adoption of particular term); Roger 
Fisher, Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence, 27 AM. B EHAV. SCIENTIST 149, 149 ( 1983) 
(noting confluence of negotiating power and military power in international relations: "At the inter­
national level, negotiating power is typically equated with military power."). 
The foregoing analysis thus resonates with Daniel Bamhizer's suggestion to expand our as­
sessment of bargaining power beyond "ad hoc generalizations drawn from the class struggles of the 
last 1 50 years." See Daniel D. Bamhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 39, 
142 (2005). These include a party's "alternatives," "opportunity to negotiate," and "traditional 
status-based classifications." See id. at 143; see also Adler & Silverstein, supra note 1 1 2, at 20 (not­
ing need to go beyond parties' BATNAs to consider "what each party can do for and to the other," 
and their related dependence on one another). 
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prominence to some particular outcome that would be favorable."178 With the 
use of boilerplate and similar focal points, thus, the "focus for agreement 
[may] not just reflect the balance of bargaining powers" but also may af­
firmatively "provide[] bargaining power to one side or the other."179 
In the case of signaling, to begin, the ability of a party to shape contract­
ing choices in binary terms may help to enhance the signaling effect of 
particular contracting proposals.180 More interestingly, a repeat player might 
find utility in defining the prevailing contracting norm downwards, even 
independent of the party's substantive contracting preferences.181 Beyond the 
substantive benefits, a lower bar may enhance the signal arising from any 
favorable deviation that the relevant party can consistently make. 
As to the coordination functions of boilerplate, the same principles ap­
ply. Here, one would expect efforts by sophisticated parties to define the 
prevailing norm in terms proximate to their preferred choices. By doing so, 
they enhance the prospect of securing such favorable terms. Most interest­
ingly, this is true independent of the conventional bargaining power of the 
party. Thus, in David's bargaining with Goliath, David might be expected to 
secure potentially significant advantage by having helped to define a con­
tracting norm closer to his preferences. Echoing the above discussion of 
changes in boilerplate, moreover, it is notable that David may have greater 
capacity to influence the contracting norm than the outcome of his head-to­
head negotiations with Goliath. Thus, intermediately sized market partici­
pants with the foresight to plan ahead and the resources necessary to 
participate in organized drafting projects may be particularly advantaged by 
participation in such efforts. 
Even relatively "weak" bargaining parties can gain advantage along the 
aforementioned lines, even if they cannot establish preferred terms as the 
prevailing standard. Assuming boilerplate favorable to its potential counter­
parties, a relatively weak party 's task need not be to establish new 
boilerplate but simply to undermine the focal power of existing boiler­
plate.182 A party does so, in essence, through the creation of competing 
boilerplate and consequent destruction of the salience of the prevailing 
norm. There is no need to replace existing boilerplate; rather, a bargaining 
party need simply displace it as the dominant norm.183 
1 78. See Schelling, supra note 2 1 ,  at 29. To analogous effect is Marc Galanter's analysis of 
how repeat players control the nature of the law by controlling what cases are appealed. See Gal­
anter, supra note 170. Russell Korobkin 's identification of "zone definition" as a significant element 
of negotiation might also be noted. See Korobkin, supra note 6 1 ,  at 1792-94. 
1 79. SCHELLING, supra note 1 ,  at 68. 
1 80. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
1 8 1 .  See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
1 82. See Schelling, supra note 2 1 ,  at 29 n.8. 
1 83. In this vein, some analogy might be made to Klausner's suggestion of the power of 
menus of corporate charter terms, in undermining network effects in corporate law. See Klausner, 
supra note 7, at 839--4 1 .  
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A final element of bargaining skill to be added to our conventional ac­
count arises particularly from the coordination functions of boilerplate. 
Specifically, the capacity to bind oneself-or "self-commitment," as Schel­
ling terms it184 -may be a significant factor in a party 's bargaining 
success.185 As described above, if a party can credibly assert its commitment 
to a particular contract term across varied circumstances--even those in 
which its own incentives v�-it may be able to more effectively insist on 
that term in any given case.18 Its hands, or so the story goes, are tied. This is 
true, moreover, regardless of the breadth of usage of the relevant term 
among other parties. 
C. The Tyranny of Big Concessions 
Boilerplate's role in coordination may also place constraints on the will­
ingness of bargaining parties to offer limited concessions. Recall that the 
proposed use of boilerplate is beneficial on account of the focal character of 
the proposed equilibrium behind the proposal. Given as much, even small 
deviations from boilerplate are dangerous. Once a small concession from 
boilerplate is made, the ability of a party to hold to its new position is sig­
nificantly undermined.187 If the party 's commitment is not to the exact terms of 
the boilerplate, then concessions beyond the first become more difficult to 
resist. Expectations of further concessions can therefore be expected to rise. 188 
Small concessions may consequently give up the game. Abandoning the 
focal point may open a party up to potential collapse of its bargaining posi­
tion.189 In Schelling's terms, given the "dependence of a 'focal point' 
solution on some characteristic that distinguishes it qualitatively from the 
surrounding alternatives . . . .  small concessions [may be] less likely than 
large ones."190 
In certain circumstances, then, large concessions may be more readily 
made than smaller ones. Shifts to an alternative point with its own focal 
power are not subject to the same pressure toward further concessions. 
Rather, such points-for example, some alternative standard applicable to 
the same issue--enjoy credibility similar to the original bargaining position. 
Such positions with distinct focal power, however, are generally likely to fall 
1 84. See Schelling, supra note 30, at 286. 
1 85. See id. at 282. In Schelling's terms, the "power to constrain an adversary may depend on 
the power to bind oneself.'' SCHELLING, supra note l ,  at 22. 
186. In recording contracts, for example, studios have long required a contract term in which 
the recorded product is denoted a "work-for-hire" to avoid the strictures of the 1 976 Copyright Act. 
See Phillip W. Hall Jr., Smells Like Slavery: Unconscionability in Recording Industry Contracts, 25 
HASTINGS CoMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 89, 2 10-16 (2002). Even musicians with significant bargaining 
power may have at least some part of that advantage undermined by the studios' consistent charac­
terization of all sound recordings as works-for-hire. 
1 87. See supra notes 143-147 and accompanying text. 
1 88. See id. 
1 89. See Schelling, supra note 2 1 ,  at 30. 
1 90. See SCHELLING, supra note l ,  at 1 1 1 .  
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at some remove from the party's original position. For this reason, one 
might reasonably predict a peculiar dynamic in which large concessions are 
more readily made than smaller ones. 191 
D. Bargaining and Adhesion in a Strategic World 
The literature of adhesion contracts-standard-form consumer con­
tracts-is voluminous. 192 Much of the discussion of boilerplate among legal 
scholars, in fact, arises in the context of that literature. The above analysis of 
boilerplate, however, suggests a complex power dynamic at work in its use, 
even outside the adhesion contract context. 193 More importantly, and by con­
trast with prevailing transaction-cost and network-effect theories of the use 
of boilerplate outside of consumer contracts, it suggests an aggressively 
strategic use of boilerplate even among similarly situated parties. 
Following naturally from this, it might be said that boilerplate gener­
ally-whatever power dynamic is evident on the face of the relevant parties' 
interaction-may raise adhesion-style issues. Some of the very concerns 
about power, and even coercion, that are commonly raised with reference to 
adhesion contracts may also deserve attention outside that context. 194 If boi­
lerplate terms enjoy significant focal power, it is useful to appreciate their 
implications for contracting power generally. 
This should not be overstated. I do not mean to suggest that the use of 
boilerplate generally-even among differently situated parties-is involun­
tary. To the contrary, both among sophisticated parties and even between 
producers and consumers, most boilerplate is likely voluntary in some rea­
sonable sense. My more limited point is that our sensitivity to 
involuntariness in consumer contracts may have some relevance in peer-to­
peer contracting as well. In essence, we do well to be cognizant of such is­
sues in cases in which the focal power of a prevailing term is sufficient to 
constitute the type of market power we conventionally expect to find in 
standard-form consumer contracts. 
E. The Missing Focal Points in Law 
Given the nature of bargaining as a coordination game, it is hardly sur­
prising to find extensive references to focal points in legal scholarship. With 
limited exceptions, however, these references overlook the most important 
implications of Schelling's focal point analysis. Echoing legal scholars' inat­
tention to the divergence between Ronald Coase's actual arguments and the 
1 9 1 .  Kyle Logue suggests as a potential example of this pattern the tendency of commercial 
insurers to have alternative standard forms, the first of which represents its opening position and the 
second its fallback. 
192. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the 
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2002); Korobkin, supra note 85. 
193. To analogous effect, see Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 15, at 23-24 (noting potential 
antitrust concerns in design of default terms). 
194. See Gilo & Porat, supra note 1 2. 
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inaptly characterized Coase Theorem,195 focal points are omnipresent in le­
gal scholarship but in ways that arguably miss their most significant 
functions. 
To begin, legal scholars tend to acknowledge a role for focal points pri­
marily when there is no conflict between the parties (that is, pure 
coordination). 196 Yet conflict was exactly what Schelling's focal point analy­
sis was intended to address. 197 While focal points may be the key to a 
resolution when conflict is absent but communication is impossible, Schel­
ling's essential project was to highlight the utility of focal points in solving 
. d . 198 IIlJXe -motive games. 
Even beyond this observation, talk of focal points in the legal literature 
almost exclusively speaks to circumstances in which communication is lack­
ing. Obviously, this is unsurprising, given the discussion above. Yet even 
where conflict is introduced, tacit bargaining tends to be the emphasis. The 
most interesting functions of focal points, however, arise in the presence of 
communication-in explicit bargaining. 199 For it is here that our instincts 
tend to mislead us, suggesting erroneously that communication should suf­
fice to remedy coordination failures. 
Finally, and perhaps as a result of the foregoing, focal points in the legal 
scholarship tend to have a relatively passive quality to them.200 They exist 
rather than are created; even when they are created, they are not a product of 
unilateral action undertaken for strategic purposes. A more active and ag­
gressive dynamic of focal points, however, follows directly from their role 
in the presence of both conflict and communication. Further, it is arguably 
such a strategic dynamic of focal points that has greatest implications for, 
and application to, legal analysis. 
The foregoing analysis of boilerplate's coordination functions thus in­
vites a broader awareness of, and attention to, focal points among legal 
scholars. Across an array of subjects, Schelling's focal point analysis may 
offer valuable insight. In particular, when coordination is required, focal 
strategies-in the hands of both public regulators and private competitors­
may offer important devices for the shaping of player incentives.201 
1 95. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against "Coaseanism", 99 YALE L.J. 
61 1 ( 1989); see also Westbrook, supra note 27, at 105 n.277. 
1 96. See, e.g., Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential 
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 
HASTINGS L.J. 1 1 87, 1232 ( 1 993) ("This problem instantiates a broader problem, described by the 
economist Thomas Schelling as that of achieving tacit coordination between parties with identical 
interests when communication is impossible."). 
1 97. See Schelling, supra note 2 1 ,  at 19. 
1 98. See id. at 23. 
1 99. See SCHELLING, supra note I ,  at 68; see also Eisenberg, supra note 1 10, at 65 1 .  Schel­
ling has suggested that "[t]he 'coordination' of expectations [in explicit bargaining] is analogous to 
the 'coordination' of behavior when communication is cut off; and, in fact, they both involve noth­
ing more nor less than intuitively perceived mutual expectations." SCHELLING, supra note I ,  at 7 1 .  
200. See, e.g., Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 100; Whytock, supra note 1 4 1 .  
201 .  See, e.g. , Ahdieh, supra note 14. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all the talk of boilerplate among legal scholars, further attention to 
its widespread use is in order. Particularly among sophisticated parties, per­
sistent adherence to contracting norms, as opposed to the tailoring of 
Pareto--or even Kaldor-Hicks--optimal terms remains inadequately theo­
rized. I offer a strategic theory of boilerplate in such circumstances. 
Through its signaling and coordination functions, the proposed use of boi­
lerplate-and occasionally deviation from it-may enable a bargaining 
party to advance its interests. 
Broadly, boilerplate may serve important communicative functions, oth­
erwise constrained by the intertwined dynamic of coordination and conflict 
at work in contract bargaining. On occasion, this may serve to enhance joint 
contractual surplus through the dissemination of information that advances 
the collective interests of parties. At least as commonly, however, the pro­
posed use of boilerplate may serve to maximize a particular party 's share of 
the contractual surplus by encouraging agreement at a coordination equilib­
rium more favorable to its desired outcome. 
Appreciation of such a strategic role for boilerplate holds various impli­
cations. It requires us to rethink the nature of bargaining skill and power and 
counsels some alteration in our expectations about patterns of contract bar­
gaining. In the right circumstances, large concessions may be easier to offer 
than small concessions. Further, if boilerplate enjoys significant focal 
power, concerns of involuntariness may have at least some application to 
contracting outside the standard-form consumer contract. 
It bears noting, moreover, that the strategic role of boilerplate may 
arise even beyond the sophisticated parties of interest herein. Thus, boiler­
plate's strategic functions shape contracting generally. In any given case, 
boilerplate may be more or less prone to play a signaling or coordination 
function. Those functions, however, are not inherently limited to the inter­
action of sophisticated parties. 
Perhaps most importantly, the foregoing analysis offers a treatment of 
focal points as instrumental and even aggressive tools of engagement among 
contracting parties. In this, it deviates from the widespread discussion of 
focal points in a passive light. Given the affirmative power of focal points in 
the hands of both regulators and private parties, however, greater attention to 
their role and use is in order. Such attention may be particularly deserved 
with regard to the role of focal points in the growing patterns of standardiza­
tion driving the global economy today. At a minimum, the foregoing 
analysis counsels greater awareness among contracting parties of the power 
of boilerplate as a bargaining tool. By influencing the shape of boilerplate 
and engaging in its selective use, parties to contract negotiations may secure 
significant advantage. 
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